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The thesis aims to present Leibniz’s monadic system as the simplest conceivable structure. 
To this end, the thesis employs both contemporary literature concerned with formal 
ontology and its logic, semantics and the nature of reference; and Leibniz’s own writings 
coupled with correspondent commentaries, including articles transcending selected 
interpretive issues into present-day discussions on actualised versions of one of the essential 
Leibnizian principles: the identity of indiscernibles. The exposition proceeds in three steps: (i) 
developing concepts of structure, determination and reference in critical confrontation with 
contemporary approaches, then (ii) applying those concepts to the interpretation of 
Leibniz’s principle of identity of indiscenibles and illuminating therewith links between 
ontology and semantics, and eventually (iii) utilizing those findings in clarifying the mirroring 
relation constitutive of the monadic structure as represented a) in Leibniz’s own 
spatiotemporal illustrations and b) in formal models in secondary literature. Acknowledging 
that the simplest conceivable structure, which is the monadic structure, can neither be 
satisfactorily expressed by spatiotemporal illustrations, nor can it be represented in formal 
system, itself forming the limit of extrinsic determination, we can better appreciate a central 
role given to the mirroring structure within Leibniz’s philosophical enterprise, as well as 
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Předkládaná práce má za cíl vykázat Leibnizův monadický systém jako nejjednodušší 
pojatelnou strukturu. K tomuto účelu využívá jak  současnou literaturu zaobírající se formální 
ontologií a její logikou, sémantikou a povahou reference, tak Leibnizovy vlastní texty 
s odpovídající sekundární literaturou včetně článků přesahující textově interpretační otázky 
směrem k diskuzím o současných formulacích jednoho ze stěžejních Leibnizovských principů: 
principu identity nerozlišených. Výklad postupuje ve třech krocích: (i) kritickým 
vyrovnáváním se se současnými přístupy rozvíjí pojmy struktury, determinace a reference, (ii) 
užívaje těchto pojmů k interpretaci Leibnizova principu identity nerozlišených, osvětluje 
vztahy ontologie a sémantiky, (iii) s pomocí osvojených vhledů pojednává vztah zrcadlení 
konstituující monadickou strukturu v návaznosti na jeho reprezentaci a) v Leibnizových 
vlastních časoprostorových ilustracích a b) ve formálních modelech Leibnizových interpretů. 
Nahlížejíce, že nejjednodušší pojatelná struktura, jež je strukturou monadickou, není 
bezezbytku vyjádřitelná ani v časoprostorových zobrazeních, ani ve formálních systémech, 
jsouc sama mezí vnější determinace, můžeme lépe ocenit jak ústřední úlohu zrcadlové 
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 Leibniz’s notion of the monad is notoriously perplexing. In a concise definition 
boasting palette of hardly reconcilable designations – such as that of being ultimately simple, 
windowless and yet a living mirror of the entire universe – is encapsulated a concept of far-
reaching philosophical import affecting areas as diverse as the structure of continuum, 
reality of time and space, the body-mind problem, the nature of sense perception, physical 
force, ontogeny or valuation of beings. However, the notion of the monad is above all an a 
priori ontological concept, establishing the most fundamental, further unanalysable, realm 
of genuinely real entities, or, which amounts to the same as will become clear later in the 
text, the ultimate structure of reality – thereby claiming to mark out a certain limit of 
conceivability. In the following I will try to take the claim seriously.  
 Philosophical ideas definitely draw their significance from the links they entwine into 
the map of thinking, but notwithstanding this, there is a sense of autarchy they keep – which 
justifies our pinpointing them from the text and treating them separately – the sense of an 
immediate persuasiveness coupled with their surprisingness: they are suggestive in virtue of 
being enlightening, not evident. In the course of the investigation I am to pursue, I will try to 
defend a thesis that the structure of Leibniz’s monad is neither arbitrary, nor merely 
relatively requisite in respect of some metaphysical or logical desiderata, but indispensable 
as such in virtue of its testifying the limits of conceivability arousing philosophers’ curiosity 
up to our days. Let the success of my enterprise be measured by the extent to which I 
manage to present the concept of monad as genuinely elucidating those constraints of our 
reasoning, on the one hand, and present those constraints so as to elucidate Leibniz’s idea, 
on the other.  
 This twofold aspiration reflects two ways in which one can encounter the 
aforementioned constraints: (i) in recurrent failures of various attempts to cash out the 
monadic structure in terms of either logical formalisation or spatiotemporal illustrations, (ii) 
in a regress of determination inherent to the notion of structure itself – and therewith to 
every formal system as such. We will proceed by first investigating the indispensable regress 
involved in determination of every structure considered on its own – so far without recourse 
to Leibniz – in the first chapter; then, in the second chapter, binding those findings in 
semantics with the realm of ontology by means of interpreting Leibniz’s original principle of 
identity of indiscernibles as perceived through the conceptual tools developed earlier; and 
eventually addressing the issues raised in both semantics and ontology by introducing a 
mirroring structure, which is the simplest conceivable structure – the monadic structure – 




 I will make use of many words: some of them quite innocent sounding, some of them 
bearing a heavy load of philosophical import, some of them even bearing a load of logical or 
mathematical import. I cannot dispense with them; and I cannot relinquish inflecting their 
meanings – because playing the same “language game” is no philosophical interpretation. 
My reading of Leibniz, as well as my systematic approach to ontology, will be crucially 
dependent on the introduction of the notion of structure, which made its appearance 
neither in Leibniz’s own texts nor in any other early modern conception of ontology, but 
significantly shaped the thinking of the twentieth century.  
 On the one hand, there are proponents of mathematical structuralism who claim 
that, since all and only properties of mathematical objects which really concern 
mathematicians are the structural ones, they should be in principle reducible to structures; 
and some physicalistic reductionists go even further in claiming that, since all and only 
properties of physical objects which really concern physicists are the measurable ones, the 
comparable ones, i. e. the structural ones, they should be reducible to structures as well – 
and with them all the ontology of scientific or philosophical theories. Yet, precise 
philosophical grounding and interpretation of such conspicuous reduction is far from clear. 
On the other hand, there are divergent approaches in interpreting what might be called 
Leibniz’s “anti-structuralism” promoted under diverse headings of “nominalism” (Mates, 
1986), “phenomenalism” (Adams, 1999), “reduction of relations to properties” (Russell, 
1900), “reduction of extrinsic denominations to the intrinsic ones”, etc. I believe that the 
notion of structure, and in particular the notion of the simplest conceivable structure, 
provides a much needed key to understanding the underlying idea behind all the purported 
“reductions” to be found in Leibniz, as well as our present perplexities regarding ontology 
and semantics of formal systems.  
 In the following chapter I will try to gradually develop an understanding of structure 
loaded with both philosophical and logical import enabling us to account for all the puzzling 
structural features of the monad. Along the way we will take into consideration some of the 
mathematical and logical concepts playing their part in contemporary formalized 
interpretations of Leibniz as well as old fashioned philosophical ones in order to delineate 




As a matter of convenience, since the thesis is written in English, rather systematic then 
historic in its scope and related predominantly to debates in “analytical philosophy” (though 
itself perhaps blending “analytical” and “continental” methods in its approach), all the 
sources I reference herein are either English written original texts, or standard English 
translations – with the sole exception of few Latin phrases taken from Gerhardt’s edition of 
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Leibniz’s philosophical works. My main source on English translations of Leibniz is the 
Loemker edition, which is highly esteemed and widely used in the English-speaking world, 
making it easier for the reader to consult other commentaries while reading my thesis. In 
addition I use less authoritative, nevertheless quite decent, English translations of Theodicy 
and New Essays. The same logic applies to my referencing other non-English primary 
literature (such as Kant’s, Hegel’s, etc.) via its standard English translations. All the 


































1. THE NOTION OF STRUCTURE 
 
 1.1 Structure and elements. Speaking of a structure we find ourselves committed to a 
kind of manifoldness1. This we may perceive as contrasted with something completely 
simple, unstructured. We might say: complexity of a structure stands for a complexity of 
relations binding some elements. But, regarding this scheme, where then is to be found that 
“simple thing”?  
 The straightforward answer “in the element” is rather precarious, taking in 
consideration that the structure in our conception draws its determinateness from 
determinateness of its elements and therefore requires discrimination of the elements from 
one another (otherwise its relations would collide or multiply at will): either in virtue of 
discriminating signs inherent to each individual element, or in virtue of their position as 
delineated on a different independent structure. Both approaches seems to lead to an 
infinite regress: either multiplying ad infinitum the elements (discriminating signs of the 
elements, discriminating signs of the discriminating signs, discriminating signs of the 
discriminating signs of the discriminating signs, etc.), or multiplying ad infinitum the 
structures (structure underlying elements of the original structure, structure underlying 
elements of the structure underlying elements of the original structure, etc.). Contrary 
strategy may claim the elements to stand for extremities of a structure – turning the 
grounding relation upside down. Thus every element bears in its determination the 
structure, which precedes it. But then again, where is the simplicity to be found? Perhaps, 
the default dichotomy of structure and element is not that well founded as we originally 
thought.  
 If an element is to maintain its identity against n other elements in virtue of its 
differentiating sings – and the identity of all the elements is to be constituted by some 
combination of differentiating signs – the situation can be conceptualized thus: first we need 
an independent structure (S) within which the entire class of signs is differentiated to ground 
identity and difference relations between the signs themselves (otherwise we would identify 
some sign in an element and once again some sign in an element, but there would be 
nothing to determine whether they are the same or different sign – while the sameness or 
difference of elements should be determined by those signs in turn); but in addition we need 
a structure (E) inherent to every element, whose positions may be occupied by those signs2. 
In the case that individual signs might repeat within a definition of a single element, or in the 
case that their order matters, it is manifestly clear that we need some independent ground 
                                                          
1 I do not mean structure or manifold in any technical, mathematical sense in this context. 
2 Given the terminology developed in 1.3.1 we can identify (S) structure with (D) semantics and (E) 
structure with (I) semantics.   
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for discriminating the positions – aside from the one determining the identity of the signs 
themselves (structure S); however even if no sign can appear twice in a definition of a single 
element, there is always something needed to secure, inter alia, precisely this – to 
determine how are the signs taken together in a form of a definition of an element. For 
example a set – a set may not be ordered, but nevertheless has definite “slots” for its 
members and so is indeed somehow structured (the point will be elaborated later in the text 
– 1.2.). With an increasing complexity of (E) structure, a number of signs (or complexity of (S) 
structure) needed to discriminate a definite number of elements of the default structure 
proportionally decreases – but this means only to relegate the task of discriminating to 
another level. One limit case would be to employ only two signs (0, 1) in an infinite structure 
(E) to differentiate any number of elements3; the contrary strategy could cope with just as 
many signs as there are elements in the default structure.  
 There is no determinate difference between completely heterogeneous 
differentiating signs – and neither a structure4. Determinate difference, which needs to hold 
between elements of any structure, should itself be somehow structured: if it is to account 
for the various differential relations binding the element in question with the other elements 
of the default structure. Therefore, the structure of a differentiating sign must somehow 
correspond to the entire default structure. We can, of course, simplify the internal structure 
of every element (E), but only at the expenses of complicating the independent structure of 
differentiating signs (S) superadded to ground their distinctness – and vice versa. If no 
ultimate resolution of complexity of a structure into simplicity of immediate identities of its 
elements is ever feasible, then every addition of external structure intended to take over 
part of a differentiative task originally assigned to internal structuring of an element only 
multiplies regresses of determination. The most parsimonious way to determine the 
elements would then be to let them determine directly by one another without any 
mediation of a superadded structure. This yields an infinite regress as well, but the regress is 
just one, self-similar and isomorphic to the default structure on every level. The internal 
structure of an element is constituted by its differential relations to other elements, 
constituting in turn its position within a default structure. If there is no independent 
structure determining differential relations among the elements, each of the differential 
relations holding between one of the elements and the rest of them is unique and 
differentiate therefore not only the one element under consideration on the background of 
the entire multiplicity, but the remaining elements among themselves as well – being 
thereby a proper representation of the default structure. And so an element mirrors in itself 
the entire structure which extrinsically determines it.  
                                                          
3 Compare Mates’ (1986) model in 3.1. 
4 For further clarifications see 1.1.1. and 2.5. 
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 This yields a basic depiction of the structure of monad, which mirrors the entire 
universe – and the universe which comprises nothing over and above the individual monads 
(no superadded structure of space, time, etc.).  
 What is the repeating pattern of such self-similar structure? – Or does it allow for any 
independently representable pattern to be repeated on various levels of the structure? 
Clearly not: if the pattern was representable independently of the contents (i. e. intrinsic 
structures) of the particular elements (monads) of the default structure (universe), there 
would hardly be any need to end up in an infinite regress while trying to determine it. If 
there was a semantically determinate interpretation of the pattern outside of the structure 
itself, the tools employed in determining this interpretation would themselves be in a need 
of determination – much like in the case of the aforementioned superadded structure of 
signs. Thus the pattern cannot be properly represented in a formal logical fashion. But then 
what is the status of the depiction of monadic structure, how does it relate to ontology and 
semantics? 
 1.1.1 Determination. A hidden assumption is involved in this reasoning: that the 
elements can be rendered distinct, exclusively either in virtue of having discriminating signs, 
or in virtue of occupying distinct positions on a structure, both of which therewith take over 
the priority regarding determination (without deciding yet, whether the priority is 
ontological, conceptual, or whichever). At least at the outset of our investigation we must 
acknowledge the dichotomy as exclusive: all determinations are considered to be either 
intrinsic (signs), or extrinsic (positions on some structure). This corresponds to Leibniz’s 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic denominations, by means of which we refer to 
those determinations – and, in my view, succeeds in expressing his nominalistic and 
phenomenalistic intuitions better than commonplace distinction between properties and 
relations.  
 There is nothing like (in itself) indeterminate structure. There can be a rigid, or non-
rigid structure (i. e. having non-trivial automorphisms), there can be a structure with vast 
areas of intrinsic indeterminacy – however, this indeterminacy is already precisely delimited 
within the structure – since structure is nothing but extrinsic determination of some content. 
Whichever status we ascribe to determination, however subjective, or objective, relative, or 
absolute, ontological, or epistemic, intensional, or extensional, the interrelatedness of the 
notion of structure and the notion of determination remains. If there is something like 
heterogeneous multiplicity, whose elements are manifold without having any determinate 
difference between them, then it simply lacks structure5.  
                                                          
5 We will return to this kind of multiplicity in 1.3.1. and 2.5. 
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 Later on we will elaborate on the account of indiscernible, yet not identical objects6; 
for our present purpose it suffices to realize that the notion of determination, thus specified, 
may be more general than the notion of identity – and definitely is more general at least 
than the notion of numerical identity (since this provides countability of identified entities 
and is therefore merely an instance of extrinsic determination7) – and that it should not be 
plagued by any epistemic commitments (the question pertaining to “discernibility” – who 
discerns and how – is only subsidiary in the case of “determination”).  
 1.2 Individual and gathering: immediate plurality. According to a common intuition 
we are inclined to say: the simple thing is one, independent individual, the simplest 
structure, thereafter, are two of these individuals taken together. But what do we really 
mean by “taken together” and what do we mean by “individual”?  
 There is more than one plausible account of such plurality. We may ask, according to 
which principles are they gathered – or, supposing we are proceeding from their plurality in 
turn, according to which principles are they to be discriminated. They have got something in 
common – they build the very same plurality (there are many ways to express this – in the 
language of predicate logic, for example: satisfy the same predicate) – and yet something 
differentiating them from one another.  
 Put in logico-mathematical terms, one may take the two together in an ordered pair 
<A, B> [standard notation] and discriminate therewith which one goes first and which one 
second. But this looks hardly as an ideal candidate for a minimal account of taking things 
together, if one can conceive of taking things together in a set {A, B} [standard notation] 
irrespectively of their order8. Set-gathering, nevertheless, prescribes a particular manner of 
taking things together specified by a set of axioms9. Some of the remarkable peculiarities of 
this axiomatisation display themselves manifestly exclusively on sets of higher cardinality, 
but at least one feature will be straightforwardly evident even in our elementary case of 
taking two things together: set-gathering entails existence of an additional abstract entity 
(i.e. a set) over and above the existence of the individual things gathered that way – and 
therewith a structure of coexistence absent for example in the case of gathering in a whole 
AB [my notation]. Such account of gathering in a whole is formalized in extensional 
                                                          
6 See 2.1. 
7 For further details see 2.5. 
8 Yet, there remains some intuitive hook in the idea of respecting the order: taking one thing after 
another: after all, we wanted to ground our concept of a structure on a simple thing, so it may sound 
quite reasonable to index some simple thing as first and proceed from it. In the subsequent we will 
return to the idea and further scrutinize it. 
9 I consider here set theory defined by Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatisation plus axiom of choice (ZFC). 
This consists of eight finite formulas and two axiom schemas formulated in first-order logic with 
equality and only one binary relation symbol ∈ for membership. 
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mereology10. While members of a set are all and only the individual things taken that way 
together, parts of a whole are all parts of the things taken that way together and all wholes 
compoundable from them11. In our case: {A, B} has only two members (namely A and B), 
while AB at least three parts (namely A, B, AB), in case A and B are partless and indivisible, 
and many more, if A and/or B are compounds – e.g. if A = CD, then AB increases its parts up 
to seven: C, D, B, A, CB, DB, AB. Yet, AB = CDB, provided A = CD, while {{C, D}, B} and {C, D, B} 
differ. This points to yet another consequence: while both accounts of plurality are 
extensional12 – in the sense that identity of a set (or a whole) is granted by the identity of its 
members (or parts) – only mereology prevents13 parts from being counted twice over – e.g. 
AA equals to A, but {A, {A}} does not equal to {A}. Taken as a set, the members indiscernible 
per se can be discriminated in virtue of their different position on a structure prescribed 
them by this “taking them together” – which is not the case with parts of a whole. 
 Mereological whole looks in comparison indeed unstructured, but not at all simple – 
at least not in a sense Leibniz would put it, i.e. without parts, indivisible. Rather the 
opposite: by taking things together in a mereological sum we multiply the amount of the 
entities granting the being to all kinds of their mutual combinations and divisions14. Being 
                                                          
10 Standard mereology would be Classical Extensional Mereology (CEM) as formalized in Goodman 
(1977) with the use of first-order logic with equality and only one primitive binary relation (Goodman 
used disjointness, but contemporary texts more conveniently use parthood or proper parthood, 
though overlap or sum might be used as well – for a discussion see (Varzi, 2003), or (Koslicki, 2004)). 
11 Quite illuminating depiction of the basic differences and possible reconciliation is found in (Lewis, 1993). 
12 While in ZFC is extensionality one of its axioms, in CEM is standardly deduced as a theorem.  There 
are three variants of formulation of extensionality in mereology – extensionality of proper parts, 
extensionality of sums, extensionality of overlap – whose difference might in some circumstances 
matter. Deduction of the theorem is based on parthood being partial order (i.e. reflexive, transitive, 
and anti-symmetric) and the principle of Strong Supplementation (SSP) stating: If y is not part of x, 
then there’s some z that’s part of y but disjoint from x. Note: Different set of axioms might be chosen 
to define mereology and those standardly involve some version of the so called supplementation 
principle. We may adopt weaker supplementation amended with a requisite fusion axiom to achieve 
the same effect, but without considering the amendment, we need a full strength of a Strong 
Supplementation Principle (SSP) to secure extensionality of the theory. The general idea of a weak 
supplementation is that if something is a proper part of something else, then there is to be 
something left, when this proper part is subtracted; general idea of a strong one is that when 
something is not part of something else, then there is to be something which makes for the 
difference. For a discussion see (Cotnoir, 2013), for an overview (Varzi, 2003).  
13 This is given by parthood being partial ordering – i.e. reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric. 
14 The principle of unrestricted composition is standardly one of the axioms of CEM; decomposition is 
subject to supplementation principle and otherwise limitable by positing the existence of a partless 
entity, a mereological atom. 
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„structureless“ in this sense, after all, does not mean refraining from prescribing 
compositional and decompositional principles: we can easily think of different 
axiomatisations allowing different models.  
 If we turn to the second question mentioned above („according to which principles 
are they to be discriminated“) from this viewpoint, we may perceive the principles in 
question as unequivocally determined by the structure of a plurality in the case of set-
gathering and left at (if restricted) will by it in the case of gathering in a whole; if we turn to 
the first one, on the other hand, („according to which principles are they gathered“), we may 
perceive the principles in question as unequivocally determined by the type of a whole (i.e. 
axioms of the mereological theory), but left at (if restricted) will by axioms of set theory. 
“Left at will” means delineable only on an external structure.  
 It became clear that it suffices to assume only a two-element plurality to face an 
abundant array of possible ways for it to be structured (in a broader sense of the notion 
promoted in this chapter) immediately, without any good reason to consider one way to be 
straightforwardly more simple or basal than the other15. Any such notion of plurality carries 
with itself implicit laws of its composition and/or decomposition – and circumscribed space 
of indeterminacy. 
 1.3 Proceeding from the simple to the complex: plurality mediated by representation. 
One might argue that those are only irrelevant peculiarities of certain formal theories 
incapable of corrupting our original idea of taking something simple – the simplest thing 
                                                          
15 Of course, set theory is considered to be the standard foundation for mathematics in the sense 
that all mathematical objects can be construed as sets – those therefore being fundamental for other 
types of mathematical pluralities as well. Mereology was formerly conceived of as an alternative to 
set theory standing on purely nominalistic grounds (i.e. not entailing the existence of abstract 
entities like sets), but due to its exhibiting too small expressive power (that of a Boolean algebra 
without zero element) never have taken the role (even though Lewis (1993) tried to revive the 
ambition with the help of plural quantification once again recently). Yet set theory itself is in a need 
of a model (which in other cases is usually construed in terms of sets) and its structure is thus not 
self-evident from the axiomatisation, but rather presupposed in its naïve interpretation (see also 
1.3.1). Moreover, paraphrasing everything in mathematics into one mode of expressing or another 
may be understood as a matter of practical convenience rather than a commitment to ontological or 
conceptual fundamentality of described pluralities in a philosophically relevant sense – even if such 
perspectives might get employed in discussions on foundations of mathematics – and the very 
possibility of such accounts justifies our discriminating between fundamentality in a sense of 
axiomatic formalization of mathematical expressive means, presupposed ontological fundamentality 
of what is being expressed and conceptual fundamentality conceived as mediating a grasp of those. 
The task of determining a concept of simplicity accountable for both structural features of Leibniz’s 
monad and our own conceptual resources for making it explicit is hardly to be satisfactorily solved by 
pointing to the features of contemporary mathematical formalism.  
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possible – together with something else quite as simple to obtain something complex – yet 
not that much complex: the second simplest thing, one would say.  
 What strikes me in this insight is the inclination to use row numbers: “second 
simplest thing”. As if the ordering after all conceptually preceded all kinds of pluralities – in a 
manner comparable to Kant’s construction in pure formal intuition of time (KRV, A142, 
A720). Behind this intellectual move lurks highly contentious claim that the complexity is to 
be built gradually from simplicity by some mathematical operation of multiplication (of a 
self-identical entity). Something is to be added to a simple unity to make it complex – so far, 
so good – but how is the addition to be interpreted? If we understand it as yielding ω–
sequence structure does it not commit us to much more of a structure, than we originally 
intended? Standard model of arithmetic after all possesses a structure of considerable 
complexity – and that indeed is what we yield to when constructing a structure by adding 
simple units to one another in the manner suggested above. But how to add without 
forming a multiplicity of at least two: the former and the latter? If already together in a unity 
of their own, the “duality” may well be doubted – for example from a mereological 
perspective: this unity lets itself be divided however you like (especially liberally in an 
atomless universe, which is the case with the Leibniz’s one). If separated, we take “the one” 
and “the one”, but how do we know, they are two? What are we implying by naming the 
entity “the one”?  
 1.3.1 Semantic interpretation. The interpretation of addition in terms of ordering 
presupposes a determined ground for recognizing the entities added this way as equivalent. 
Two distinct semantics are to be at hand here: the one (D) assigning different position on a 
structure to counted entities and the one (I) enabling such assignment by assigning one and 
the same position on a structure to the entities. The scruples to accomplish blithely a 
transition from “the former and the latter” to “the first and the second” are analogous to 
those making us reluctant to concede that by taking something together with something else 
we obtain TWO things. The move may be blocked by indeterminacies in either D-semantics 
(by taking some water together with some water I cannot acquire anything like “two 
waters”)16 or in I-semantics (by taking some stone together with some pain I cannot acquire 
any plurality of two)17. Correspondingly in the case of “the former and the latter”: the 
                                                          
16 The problematic of non-count nouns is developed at length in Laycock (2004, 2006). In the 
following I draw substantially from his observation and I will return to it in more detail later in the 
text. 
17 Bergson (1910) once coined the term “heterogeneous multiplicity” as contrasted with 
homogenous multiplicity. Deficiencies in I-semantics leads to forming of a multiplicity which at least 
lacks some homogeneity, but there is no mention of other basic features of Bergson’s heterogeneous 
multiplicity at this point. However, in the course of further development of our notion of simple 
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identification (I-semantics) of the entities in question as both being events of delimited 
duration ground the possibility of their differentiation in the structure of time (D-semantics). 
Perceived that way, our initial insight was not at all that innocuous as presented entailing 
commitments to universal arithmetized  structure of “time intuition” (from Kantian 
viewpoint) – which straightforwardly corresponds neither to our subjective experience (we 
cannot discriminate “the first moment” from “the second one”, since there is no natural 
demarcation line in the continuous passage of time and our consciousness is supposed to be 
directly acquainted only with present – articulated in identifications based on recollections 
of the past, whose memory in turn makes its appearance merely within the scheme of 
present identifications18), nor to its presentation in contemporary physics. In such 
construction of complexity by addition of simple elements we either way presuppose, what 
is to be constructed – and does not proceed any further behind our supposition. 
 The assumption having been made here is the one concerning structure as the 
interpretation of a talk about some multiplicity. This is what the notion of structure amounts 
to in model theory19. However, such structures are standardly construed set-theoretically                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
(though there are attempts at developing a naïve model theory as well), which makes the 
interpretation of the axioms of set theory itself a bit problematic and after all commits us to 
presupposing a structure (standardly a very peculiar one – built from sets) instead of 
constructing it from something unstructured in the first place. Such is a price of 
discriminating between language and its interpretation and introducing therewith a principle 
of representation into our conceptual scheme. The move is enforced by a need to establish 
identity of distinct elements taken together in a single reference act. From this point on the 
initial question of what are the principles gathering entities into a plurality under 
consideration, or respectively what are the principles discriminating them therein – provided 
we are proceeding from their plurality in turn – mentioned at the outset of 1.2 lets itself 
rephrase into a question of how do we determine an interpretation identifying them with 
one another ((I) semantics), or respectively how do we determine an interpretation 
identifying every one of them individually ((D) semantics). “Principles” in question might 
have been operations of a subject as well as inner articulations of an object, but 
determination of an interpretation is subject to (and constituted by) criteria of meaningful 
reference to it.  
 Either way we were unable to fully determine a structure by means of something 
supposedly unstructured, simple. Even the simplest structure. Which, on top of it, we are 
unable to find – unsurprisingly, since we have no clue how to (in an unequivocal manner) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
structure other essential qualities of Bergson’s heterogeneous multiplicity will come to the fore such 
as interpenetration of all its elements analogous to Leibniz’s mirroring. 
18 This observation was notably pointed out by James, Bergson and Whitehead. 
19 For an introduction to model theory see Hodges (2013) 
18 
 
accomplish the transition from simplicity to complexity. On the other hand, do we have any 
definite grasp of simplicity, in the first place? And do we need any? We can posit a simple, 
unstructured thing by definition, indeed. By this we could mean an extreme of analysis, for 
example – but then again, there should be a structure of what is being analysed, or at least a 
structure of our analytical proceedings posited beforehand, which ultimately defines the 
elementary. Although – how far should we mingle what we mean to be there with how we 
mean it? Subsequent sub-chapter will give us some hints. 
 1.3.2 The identity in reference. There are some striking entailments involved in the 
suggested shift in conceptualisation. Gathering of entities is specified as a gathering in an act 
of reference, which gives certain criteria for what counts as an entity, or what counts as  a 
multiplicity: clearly, we are excluding from our consideration whatever cannot be 
meaningfully referred to. Before determining the scope of this restriction – what can and 
what cannot be meaningfully referred to – we should acknowledge that the restriction is 
hardly a necessary one: there might be a plentiful of multifarious stuff which cannot be 
referred to out there (actually, it would not be inconceivable to posit a fundamental 
ontological level consisting exclusively of such stuff). Moreover, if concerns are raised, that 
therewith we engage in the talk of what cannot be properly talked about, the objection 
might be turned upside down in response, asking what grants the existence to entities 
whose identity is constituted solely in a reference act. It is not only possible, but manifestly 
inevitable, that existence transcends its determination in reference: what else would it mean 
to refer, than to represent something which itself is not present – if it was already right at 
hand with all its qualifications and potential manifestation further unaccountable, then it 
would conflate with this very reference act itself, which no longer would refer to anything 
external to it. If reference makes sense, then only at the proviso that what is being referred 
to transcends it. This alone does not grant the existence of something incapable of being 
referred to (since it is precisely in a reference act where has been this transcendence of 
existence established and since this transcending existence is precisely what is being 
referred to), but justifies scruples to grant existence to entities determined by the identity 
constituted in reference act – scruples symmetrically analogous to those precluding 
acknowledgement of entities outside of the realm of what can be meaningfully referred to.  
 Furthermore, it is not only for the concerns regarding ontology, which submit to a 
conceptualisation via means of reference only at the cost of transcending it at the same 
time, it is for the expressive means of natural language itself, which seems to do or express 
things20 in various different ways having very little to do with straightforward mode of 
                                                          
20 Austin‘s famous tenet (Austin, 1962) that by words we often actually do things in the world instead 
of just representing them is followed by a conviction that efficacy of linguistic acts is carried by their 
institutionalised regularity and therefore they bring about new things in the world only by 
representing the existing ones; on the other hand every linguistic representation is without a doubt 
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referring and enables forming of meaningful and interpersonally efficient expressions 
without determined referent, that we should be cautious about introducing restrictions 
regarding what there is based on what we can meaningfully refer to.  
 However, those objections notwithstanding, some prominent strands in philosophy 
have always sided with the view. One of the most notable among them epitomized in 
Quine’s approach is based on singular reference as a fundamental mode of referring, to 
which all other forms of relating to extra-linguistic reality are to be ultimately reducible – 
which will be subject to our further enquiry in the subsequent sections – but the driving 
force behind this, a preoccupation with singularity of being, is motivated by reasons 
independent of search for identity criteria constitution in reference and we must scrutinize 
those as well.  
 Before doing so, let me summarize the preliminary outcome of this chapter. At the 
outset of the investigation we constructed infinite regresses as a result of an attempt to 
determine a structure by its elements, or elements by a structure. Proceeding this way, we 
relied on a very vague intuition of what determination and determinateness might mean. 
From the perspective developed in 1.3 we can specify “determinate” as “identifiable in 
reference” and conceptualize the suggested regresses as semantic regresses (in the more 
technical sense of the word “semantic” confining language to referring). As an alternative to 
this, the account of a “more realistic” regress might be taken into consideration – and in this 
sense “determination” would mean real determination of one entity (or event, or 
phenomenon, or whatever you judge to be fundamentally real) by another21. However, even 
if the criteria of identifiability in reference were inapt to determine what there is, they might 
nevertheless suffice to frame our search for the simplest conceivable structure – after all, 
their precise nature with respect to their congruence with the limits of conceivability of 
structural complexity and simplicity is yet to be determined. To this end we will investigate 
the notion of identity, identification and meaningful reference in the following section. 
Notwithstanding the possible criteria’s ultimate insufficiency, the enterprise is worth 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
already a thing in the world; and so the two accounts might converge to each other ultimately. 
Nevertheless, significant deviation from the straightforward mode of referring attributed to language 
is introduced alongside: what a linguistic act reproduces is a certain praxis, which not only defies 
standing for a proper object of the linguistic expression in question, but might defy identification in 
any possible act of reference performed in that language as such. That there must be some 
fundamental level of practices or „life forms“ incapable to be made explicit is a well-established 
interpretation of later Wittgenstein. 
21 Typical example would be, provided extension is ultimately real (and therewith possibly 
transcending its geometrical representation), determination of extended entities in space by one 
another. The significance of the dichotomy will become clear when confronting our account with that 
to be found in Leibniz’s own writings later in the text. 
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undertaking bearing in mind that vast majority of twentieth century secondary literature 
dedicated to uncovering hidden peculiarities a structure of past thinkers’ ontologies does 
not even reflect on them, not to say question them.  
 1.4 Reference and structure. We are to investigate a determination construed as a 
constitution of identity in reference. We already hinted at the possibility that this does not 
exhaust the entire class of all determinations (we pondered an eventuality of real 
determination as well, concluding that the incompleteness of the overlap between those 
two might not be something merely accidental, but rather an indispensable requirement of a 
reference act), however, there are strong indications that without the identifiability in 
reference we cannot make sense of any structure. In fact, the concept of structure 
presupposes identifiability in reference, or: every reference is enabled by an underlying 
structure, or: every structure is constituted by multiple references.  
 The latter point is of the utmost importance: if structure is a principle of extrinsic 
determination, it presupposes, or constitutes borderlines between distinct interiors and 
exteriors (which is not the case with the intrinsic determination), so as to at least ground a 
possible abstraction from particular contents – if it is not straightforwardly identified with 
this abstraction. In this sense, a structure is a ground for rendering some contents 
equivalent. But equivalency of contents is exactly what identity as constituted in reference 
claims: this identity should secure that by referring to the same thing, we really refer to the 
same thing, or: that two references can be equivalent as to their contents. If a reference 
were a singular event, not grounding any subsequent repetition, we could hardly claim that 
it refers to something: to make this sole claim, we would need to use another, distinct 
reference to the thing – and assert the equivalence of the two references. Not only there is 
no way of claiming that a reference refers to something without the use of another 
reference, but there is no way of making sense of such unrepeatable reference, there is no 
difference between such referring and not referring at all, if the thing referred to is nowhere 
to be found outside of the solitary reference. So a possibility of repetition and equivalence of 
contents is indispensable for the notion of reference. And this merely potential multiple 
application of a reference already constitutes a structure binding the possible equivalent 
instances of the reference. In fact, it is hard to conceive of a structure (as contrasted with 
content, which inevitably transcends every reference) as transcending the identity criteria 
based on reference and so it can always be viewed as consisting of only representations – or 
as constituted by multiple references22.    
                                                          
22 This observation should be kept in mind while investigating Leibniz’s ground for denying reality to 
structures. If the structures consist of mere representations, it is natural to think of their reality as 
dependent on the reality of what is represented – unless we do not acknowledge a representation to 
constitute the very essence of what is ultimately represented as real (as we eventually indeed will), 
but in that case a fundamental structure is to be found and all the other structures (of space, time, 
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 1.4.1. Criteria for an entity. With this proviso in mind – that as an entity counts 
whatever is capable of being determined within a structure, or whatever is capable of 
determining a structure – and so, strictly speaking, not whatever there is – we can 
investigate the criteria of what could count as an entity based on its identity in reference. 
 Canonical for the issue is Quine’s “On What There Is”, where his famous dictum “to 
be is to be a value of a bound variable” is paradigmatically expressed. Delimiting minimal 
conditions of an account of entity at the beginning of his article he tosses a rhetorical 
question:  “But what sense can be found in talking of entities which cannot meaningfully be 
said to be identical with themselves and distinct from one another?” (Quine, 1948) Needless 
to say that he finds no sense in such talk and considers the answer evident, but giving 
supposedly evident minimal condition for any entity he posits latently condition for 
meaningfulness as well. His later claim from the midst of the article that the “ways of talk 
about meaning boil down to two: the having of meanings, which is significance, and 
sameness of meaning, or synonymy” can be found already wrapped up in the former one. 
Having meaning for Quine means being substitutable. Bearing in mind, what does “ways of 
talk about meaning boil down to” we can infer what does ways of talk about entities boil 
down to: reference.  
 If we consider the qualification “to be identical with themselves and distinct from one 
another” on its own, it exhibits a bit nonsensical tinge: how can anything be identical to itself 
without being somehow doubled, and therefore distinct from itself at the same time?23 And 
accordingly, how can they be “distinct from one another”, if they were to be identical in the 
first place? However, this makes perfect sense if we acknowledge an entity only insofar as it 
casts its virtual existence in reference. Acknowledgement that an entity “x” exists, may be 
put in Quine’s terms as follows: ∃y(x=y). An entity cannot be taken separately on its own, 
because it is already taken together with the implication, that there is something else 
capable of standing for it – without this condition it cannot be qualified as an entity. This 
justifies the plural form of the qualification: it wouldn’t be unconceivable to think of its 
singular version – “to be identical with itself and distinct from the other” – or half-singular 
one – “to be identical with itself and distinct from others” – but those versions strike us as 
being unsaturated: Which one do we mean by “the other” of the entity in question? Which 
ones do we mean by “others” of the entity in question? Do we need to talk about something 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
etc.) will be representations of it as conjoined with its ultimate content and so not strictly 
isomorphic, i. e. less real. 
23 This resembles tractarian critique of the notion of identity (Roughly speaking: to say of two things that 
they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing. 
(Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 5.5303)). We will return to the issue of identity in the next chapter; for now 
it is worth keeping in mind that we already pondered an interpretation of an explicit plurality based 
on parallel reference to (I) semantic and (D) semantic. 
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else at the same time to meaningfully talk about something? And how many of them – 
perhaps all the others? This looks implausibly circular, yet there is something to it. The plural 
version keeps this24, but dissolves strict dichotomy between this and the other25: we don’t 
need a determinate other, only a substitutable one26. We don’t need to posit and determine 
something external to the things being talked about – only a trace of their reference. 
 1.4.2 Singularity: identity and reality. However, Quine does not stick with the general 
formulation “identical with themselves and distinct from one another”, which not only 
eschew commitments to determinate “others”, or a determinate environment – a 
determinate content of what is posited alongside with the thing we want to “meaningfully 
talk about” – a determinate content of an accompanying structure of reference – but leaves 
unspecified number and countability of this thing being talked about as well; Quine goes on 
to specify identity of an entity to be constituted prominently in singular reference – and only 
derivatively in other ways of referring. He could have perfectly well retained the criterion “to 
be identical with themselves and distinct from one another” without specifying number or 
countability of what is being talked about; he could have equally well retain even the dictum 
"no entity without identity" (Quine 1969, p. 23) in its full generality without implying 
whether the identity in question is to be somehow numerical (and how exactly), or whether 
we should rather consider it as qualitative; and eventually he could have retained the idea of 
synonymy, and substitutivity wrapped up in it, as well – this latter case is a bit contentious, 
however, since we could do something like this in an informal manner and we could at least 
use plural quantification in his formal definition of existence (i. e. ∃Y(X=Y), where X, Y are 
plural variables), but the interpretation of plural quantification itself regarding ontological 
commitments is spurious27 with some claiming its ontological innocence and irreducibility to 
                                                          
24 In Hegel’s words from the chapter “Something and an other” in The Science of Logic: “It preserves 
itself in its non-being and is being; not, however, being in general but being with reference to itself in 
contrast to its reference to the other, as self-equality in contrast to its inequality. Such a being is 
being-in-itself “ (Hegel, 2010, p. 92) 
25 Following Hegel: “It therefore stands in reference to an otherness without being just this 
otherness. The otherness is at once contained in it and yet separated from it; it is being-for-other.“ 
(Hegel, 2010, p. 92)  
26 Regarding conceivability and existence of parts of matter Leibniz opposes de Volder’s contention 
that “that one part of an extended thing cannot exist or be conceived without the others” by 
conceding that from his arguments “it follows indeed that one part of matter cannot exist without 
some other part, but it hardly follows that it cannot exist without these particular others” (L, 519). 
We will return to the argument while discussing mutual determination of parts within a real 
structure.  
27 See: Linnebo (2017). 
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singular reference28, while others its ontological significance (e. g. entailing the existence of 
concepts) conjoined with irreducibility to singular reference and yet others its ontological 
significance (entailing the existence of set-like entities) conjoined with reducibility to singular 
reference29. But those complications regarding formalisation (which, after all, in its 
conceptual resources is subject to some particular historically instituted structural 
preconceptions) should not plague the observation: we need identity in reference and for 
this we require substitutivity – but it is far less clear that we need singularity as well.  
 In fact, reasons for this might be rooted in a certain ontological preoccupation, rather 
than in contemplations of semantic requirements. Let us expound the idea in more detail. 
We already gave up the ambition that the criteria for something to be identifiable in 
reference, which we are trying to delimit, give us any general criteria for something to be. 
Moreover, we harbour a contention, that “what there is” must systematically deviate from 
what we can identify in reference – and that what marks a real being is precisely that it 
cannot be substitutable in any sense. An yet, despite this contention, we push the analysis 
one step further to insist that the reference must be singular and the identity therewith 
numerical, based on a historically well-established preoccupation with singularity of being: if 
we refer to more things (countably many, or uncountably many, constituting a continuous 
multiplicity), we are convinced that if not the identity in reference (e. g. of a continuous stuff 
being referred to), then certainly the reality of the multiplicity in question is based in the 
reality of its elements in themselves. We might be inclined to think that singular reference is 
really the most fundamental type of reference, to which all other types of reference are 
either reducible, or at least, on which they are heavily dependent – while the converse does 
not hold – and correspondingly that an identity of a singular object is a basic type of identity 
constituted in reference. This being the ground for the “singularity of being thesis”. But our 
intuitions employed in evaluation of everyday experience teach us the contrary: we make 
reference to empirical objects with a contention that they should be identifiable in 
reference, that we should be capable to refer to the same object – in a sense of this identity 
– repeatedly, and yet, at the same time, on the level of ontology (regarding their real 
determination, or real identity) we deem them to be in permanent flux, not at all singular in 
itself, but rather multiple, divisible and ever dividing, loosing severed parts and gaining new 
ones: we indeed deem the reality of an object to be derived from the reality of its 
supposedly singular constituents, not its identity in reference. Moreover, genuine singularity 
of being far from being required for identity in reference is strictly opposed to it. As we have 
already seen, identity requires contrariwise non-singularity, multiplication and substitutivity.  
                                                          
28 See: Boolos (1984). 
29 See: Catwright (1993). 
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 Let us first elucidate our conviction that the criterion of identifiability in reference is 
not strong enough to secure singularity of the object referred to – and so that singular 
reference imposes additional structure to the one necessitated by identifiability alone; and 
then, in the next section, explore the independent root of the preoccupation with 
singularity.  
 1.4.3 Singular reference. Quine and with him most of the philosophers and logicians 
of the twentieth century insisted that all the other modes of referring available in natural 
languages should be in principle reducible, in a rigorous philosophical discourse, to singular 
reference, but from the 80’s on the stance seems to be not that unanimously sided30. 
Laycock persuasively shows that some of the most recognised thinkers of the twentieth 
century31 considered “object” to be the most basal, further unanalysable, philosophical 
category and calls up Tugendhat’s words encouraging even more far reaching claim: 
“Tugendhat tells us that ‘The fundamental question of ontology is: what is being as being?’, 
and he reformulates this question as the question of ‘what it means to speak of an object’.” 
Whatever there is must satisfy the criteria of objecthood, because we were supposed to be 
unable to “meaningfully speak about” something failing them. A unique object of a 
reference was required to render the reference fully determined (however, this is, according 
to our preliminary analyses, neither necessary, nor sufficient). If this were the case, equality 
of references yielding an identity in reference would render the object of the reference 
singular; and a failure of a singular reference to refer uniquely would mark the boundary of 
our basic ontological category.  
 The serious challenge to this view – especially because of its coming from the camp 
of logicians, from which this metaphysical preoccupation to a considerable extent drew its 
legitimacy – was provided by Boolos’ deliberations concerning plural reference. He has not 
only pointed out to the fact that in natural languages we use plural reference and 
quantification as surely and flawlessly as the singular one and that there are plural locutions 
in natural languages, which are either completely irreducible to first order formulas using 
only singular variables, or merely so at the cost of being highly counterintuitive and hard to 
entangle, which had been observed even before, but more importantly advocated the use of 
                                                          
30 As canonical turning point is perceived Boolos‘ article (Boolos, 1984). For an introduction on Plural 
Quantification see Linnebo (2014), for a discussion of its overlap in metaphysics see Laycock (2014) 
and Laycock (2004), Laycock (2006). 
31 Laycock (2014) takes into consideration mainly thinkers from the so called analytical tradition 
listing Russel, Wittgenstein, Lowe, Strawson, Quine, Tugendhat among those embodying such a view. 
This is rather intuitive given the extent to which the topic is intertwined with logical issues, but 
perhaps analogical reflexion may very well be carried out with respect to thinkers of 
phenomenological tradition as well – we will not however delve into the issue any further. 
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plural logic as “ontologically uncommitted”32, “pure logic”33 variant provided with extra 
expressive power capable of solving some of the problems in formal logic34.  
 Laycock (2014) takes the discussion even further pointing out the issue of genuinely 
non-count nouns. While approving plural reference alongside the singular one as two equally 
basic, mutually irreducible modes of referring made the up to then necessary conditions for 
something to be something look more arbitrary, it generally did not justified transgressing 
the constrains: “many” are only “many ones”, “some” are “some ones”. Plural logic codifies 
different form of referring to the old entities: that is necessitated by the claim to ontological 
innocence. As Laycock puts it: “Since, as Boolos in effect observes, there is no such thing as 
the (one, single) object of a plural reference, there is no such thing as the (one, single) value 
of a plural variable; such a variable has some values, several values, not just one.” (Laycock, 
2004). And these values are subject to the very same constrains as that of a singular variable. 
But if we attempted to introduce variable for non-count nouns as well, the situation would 
be remarkably different: “…given the non-singularity of non-count reference, there can be 
no such object as the value of a non-count variable. Much as a plural variable has some 
values (e.g. some clothes) and not one value, a non-count variable may be said to have some 
value (e.g. some clothing) and not one value. There is then a range of distinct substituents in 
cases of this kind; but there is no corresponding range of discrete values.” (Laycock, 2004). 
 The introduction of something like non-count variable into logical formalisation is in 
every respect problematic, as hinted at earlier, but the reasons for the apparent 
incompatibility are likely to be sought not in the nature of reference, but rather in the nature 
of formal logical discourse, which is closely bind (in its origin as well as in its contemporary 
development) to mathematical discourse, where numerical identity plays a crucial role and 
                                                          
32 Standardly a plural reference used to be transliterated as singular reference referring to a set. But 
this is seen as transgressing constrains of „pure logic“(see footnote 33), because of committing to the 
existence of the abstract entity referred to in the expression. Using plural variables, as Boolos 
suggested (Boolos, 1984), is ontologically innocent and does not refer to some set, class or collection 
of things taken together but only to the things themselves – though not singularly but plurally. As 
Boolos somehow emphatically puts it: “It is haywire to think that when you have some Cheerios, you 
are eating a set – what you’re doing is: eating THE CHEERIOS.”(Boolos, 1984). However matters are 
not that conclusively receipted and some argue against the ontological innocence thesis – for a 
discussion see (Linnebo, 2014). 
33 Linnebo (2014) concerning “pure logicality” of plural first-order language lists these three criteria: 
(i) absolute generality / universal applicability, (ii) formality / ontological innocence, (iii) cognitive 
primacy / perfectly well understood. 
34 These include showing how two of the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, Replacement 
Schema and Separation Schema, can be replaced by a finite formula in plural first-order logic and 
showing how monadic second-order logic can be interpreted in plural first-order logic, proving 
therewith its “pure logicality”. 
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so having an extension not numerically structured at the bottom level seems hardly an 
option (this ultimate reason is only enforced by a well-established praxis of quantifying over 
sets, construing properties in terms of sets of objects satisfying them, etc.). If we, on the 
other hand, turn our attention to examples from natural languages, we see all kinds of 
references, which are no less basic, no less irreducible, and equally naturally understood as 
references to some purportedly singular objects: besides Laycock’s notorious mass nouns 
“water”, “gold” and “clothing” we can think of references to other quite concrete things like 
“grass”, “rain”, “sunshine” and “dawn” – or we can argue that concreteness of its object has 
nothing to do with simplicity of a reference and ponder possible singularity of such nouns as 
“love”, or “traffic”.  
 Let me summarise our account of the criteria imposed by identifiability in reference 
on all entities (capable of determining, or being determined by, a structure). Those entities, 
far from being singular in itself subsisting objects, are always already multiplied in their 
reference traces, in which they can be “identical with themselves and distinct from one 
another”. For convenience we spoke of “repeated referring” as if the reference trace should 
be discretized by individual instances of possible reference, but this is clearly not the case: 
the reference trace must secure continuity (needless to add that this continuity should not 
be conceived of merely as a time continuity, because: firstly, what is being referred to does 
not need to be extended in time, secondly, repeated references themselves do not need to 
be linearly ordered in time – they might for example all be written on one sheet of paper). In 
a limit case we can think of the object of reference as nearly singular and its indeterminate 
neighbourhood of reference, on the background of which it differentiates itself, as nearly 
without content, nearly the sole borderline of exterior and interior (extrinsically 
differentiating structure and intrinsic self-differentiation). Then you refer to something 
extremely volatile, which disappears right after the referring, but nevertheless, the reference 
casts as if a shadow in virtuality, tracking the disappearance of its object, enliven either by 
an immediate reflection, or a shared presence. But without this specious possibility of re-
reference there is no reference either.  
 1.4.4 Singularity of being. If a preoccupation with the singularity of being prevails 
nevertheless in the course of western thought (making Leibniz himself avow Aristotelian 
creed “being and one are convertible terms”35), it is not necessitated by a need to secure its 
identity in reference, but rather by a requirement of its transcending this identity. An object 
of representation taken as real must transcend its representation, as already indicated, and 
if its identity in representation renders it repeatable (representable) – identifiable in a 
homogenous repetition – then its real identity must render it escaping this identification, 
                                                          
35 Aristotle (1984), 1003b20; Leibniz: L, 603. 
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being irreducibly singular, unique, one of its kind36, heterogeneous, incomparable with 
others in any common extension. As Leibniz puts it:  
 “For the rest, so far removed am I from holding that a single individual is a plurality 
that I am even deeply convinced of the teaching of St. Thomas about intelligences but hold 
that it is valid generally, namely, that there cannot be two individuals entirely similar or 
differing only in number.” (L, 337-336) 
 The unity demanded of every real being is not a mere numerical unity – which is 
accidental to it, delimited externally in an extension of reference as an extrinsic 
denomination – but a true unity, unity per se – by which a real being differentiates itself by 
itself – and in itself. The identity in reference is imposed from outside upon per se non-
identical entities, while the intrinsic identity of those entities is procured by their unified 
self-differentiation – which precludes them to be “self-identical”. The union of those two 
identities is to be established in the foreshadowed principle of identity of indiscernibles – 





















                                                          
36 In this respect all of Leibniz’s substances are like Aquinas‘ separate substances: “…what St. Thomas 
says on this point about angels or intelligences (quod ibi omne individuum sit species infima) is true 
of all substances…” (L, 308). See also: L, 268, 308, 337 
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2. THE IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES 
 
 In the construction of the default regresses we required distinct elements to be 
differentiated by discriminating signs or different positions on a structure – signs being 
inherent to each element, while positions being external to them. A suspicion might have 
been raised that any contradistinction necessarily entails perspective of a possible perceiver 
– be it a finite mind, or an infinite one, as Leibniz would put it, or generally whichever 
conceivable subject (e. g. animal, plant, infinitesimal consciousness of unanimated chunk of 
matter in panpsychist scheme, or an artificial sensor of a machine). One might adopt 
radically deflationary view and claim that there is no sense in talking about discriminating 
anything, if relevant perspective of an observer with its own relative criteria of difference 
and identity were not given; or take a moderate stance, claiming that things might not 
actually conflate (might not be actually identical) even if they were distinguishable neither in 
itself, nor in relation to other by any possible observer – and therefore that alongside all 
kinds of relative notions of differing, there is an ultimately inapproachable real difference as 
well. This latter view seems to straightforwardly violate the principle of identity of 
indiscernibles (PII), which, as a core principle of Leibniz’s metaphysics, has already received 
extensive treatment in secondary literature and on the top of it over the course of past 
hundred years has remained in its modified version subject to lively debates in logic, but 
despite all this, or perhaps exactly because of it, has rarely been presented in an 
unprejudiced manner capable of illuminating our present riddle. The reason for this is to be 
sought in a preoccupation with formal logic and therewith a preoccupation with identity as 
constituted in singular reference, although roots of this superstition reach far back to the 
ontological load being bestowed on numerical identity as compared to the qualitative one 
early in the history of philosophy. There has always been good reasons to consider 
qualitative identity somehow more subjective than the numerical one – that being therefore 
somehow more objective in turn, but perhaps we should have been more cautious in 
translating this into ascription of ontological priority.  
 2.1 Semantic and ontological reading. If we take the case at its face value from the 
viewpoint of a dichotomy developed in the previous chapter, we can think of a structure 
either as a real organization of things, or as an interpretation of a talk about them (an 
organization of possible reference to them); in a semantic reading by claiming things to be 
non-identical, yet indistinguishable, we ascribe to them one and the same position in one (I) 
structure, while ascribing them two different positions in another (D) structure; in an 
ontological reading we mirror the move, but acknowledge those structures to be real 
organizations. Both of the views allow themselves to be internally hierarchized: either we 
are convinced that one of the semantics is actually meta-semantic (typically, though not 
necessarily, (D) structure being meta-semantics of (I) structure), or we posit one of the real 
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orders of organization to be more fundamental, bearing therewith ontological priority 
(again, typically this would be (D) structure). Introducing hierarchy means introducing 
ordering and this in turn means nothing less than projecting on yet another structure (whose 
particular form may differ depending on whether we want to speak only of a partial ordering 
or of a total order). And so the very construction of the infinite regress depends on 
presupposing an algebraic structure: either as an order of semantic levels or as an order of 
ontological levels.  
 However, combination of those is conceivable as well: since we inevitably face 
infinite semantic regresses, we should presuppose a fundamental order of organization of 
things grounding basic identity- and difference-relations to be ultimately real – and perhaps 
inapproachable in reference. Naturally, (D) structure would then be postulated as an 
inapproachable level of the ultimate, further unanalyzable differences, while (I) structure 
would yield only relative identities synthetized in reference. But it is not inconceivable to 
turn the scheme upside down to claim (I) structure to be the ultimate ontological level of 
further unsynthetizable identities and (D) structure to yield differences between 
perspectives of distinct references to it. Someone who rejects any notion of absolute 
(observer-independent) difference may side with this view – but then he is bound to explain 
why should there be absolute identity if absolute difference is banished. Analogical objection 
may be raised against the former view, if it means to establish the ontological level as 
ultimately transcendent to reference: why should there be absolute difference if absolute 
identity is not admitted? A deflationist may proceed even further in his critique insisting that 
both identity and difference (and with them, of course, every notion of structure or 
organization) should be considered solely as dependent on a perspective of an observer. But 
would not this amount to forbidding virtually all ontology? It is hard to conceive of this move 
being genuinely accomplished – especially when we think of all those great pronouncements 
of refraining from ontological judgements which ended up in the most flagrant ontological 
superstition unable to even make sense of realizing it37. However, could not it be the case 
                                                          
37 Positivists has always been notorious for this; but contemporary debates over analytical 
metaphysics are no less representative: proponents (e. g. Fine, 1999; Koslicki, 2008; Sattig, 2015; 
Sider, 2008, 2011) are accused of arbitrarily reifying selected abstract (mathematical) structures (led 
by simplifying folk physics rather than complexity of a structure disclosed in up to date special 
sciences), while their critics (Ladyman, Ross, 2007) dream of ontology being reducible to 
mathematical structuralism as such. Needless to say that mathematical structuralism itself has hard 
time accomplishing proposed reduction of objects to structures and deciding on how to understand 
it and how to make those “grounding” these, if only  in the realm of mathematical entities, without 




that reasonable constrains imposed on observer-dependency might nevertheless facilitate 
meaningful ontological talk?  
 2.2 Formulation of PII. Let us investigate the account given of the PII in more recent 
literature. It seems that Russell, in cooperation with Whitehead, was among the first to 
employ a variant of the principle38 to define identity by means of logical formalization in 
Principia Mathematica (1910); his own curious comments in the Critical Exposition of the 
Philosophy of Leibniz (1900), however, reveal an understanding much more nuanced with 
respect to Leibniz’s philosophy, than the one enforced by the phrasing in terms of modern 
logic. It is a commonplace in systematic philosophical discourses, as well as the logical ones, 
to cash out “indiscernibility” in terms of sharing all properties (satisfying the same 
predicative functions39): ∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) → x=y 40  
Using such paraphrasing, we clearly restrict ourselves solely to a variant of the first 
understanding sketched above, i. e. to the semantic one.  
 Mates hints at a possible source of this inaccuracy in adoption of Leibniz’s original 
principle. He points out that: “Some scholars have considered the Identity of Indiscernibles 
to be just half, as it were, of the salva veritate criterion. They interpret the latter as a 
generalized biconditional: ‘x is the same as y if and only if whatever is true of x is true of y, 
and vice versa’, or, perhaps equivalently, ‘x is the same as y if and only if every attribute of x 
is an attribute of y, and vice versa’, and then they call the generalized conditional from left 
to right “the Indiscernibility of Identicals” and that from right to left “the Identity of 
Indiscernibles”.” (Mates, 1986, 134)  
 The difference between the salva veritate criterion41 and Leibniz’s original PII seems 
to me striking: the salva veritate criterion speaks about substitutivity of terms (regarding 
possible truth value of linguistic expression), whereas PII speaks about discernibility of 
beings (eventually reducible to substances42) – in both previously developed 
conceptualisations, either semantic, or ontological, as well as in their combination. 
                                                          
38 He indeed explicitly relates himself to Leibniz’s identity of indiscernibles in the Introduction, but 
one might argue that his proceedings should better be perceived as an application of another of 
Leibniz’s principles, namely the salva veritate criterion. 
39 Russell could rephrase in virtue of the axiom of reducibility:  x=y & ψx → ψy  taking into account 
both predicative and non-predicative functions. (Russell, 1910, 168) 
40 The formulation is given in Forrest (2016); surprisingly even Brandon C. (2017) does not hesitate to 
misrepresent Leibniz’s original account in such a way. 
41 The salva veritate criterion is often called “Leibniz’s Law”:  ∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) ↔ x=y  
Even a plural version can be encountered in literature (e. g. Calosi (2016)), which must utilize 
Russell’s rephrasing (see the footnote above): x=y & ψx → ψy  for x, y ranging over both singular and 
plural terms.  
42 This is a standard view promoted by inter alia Mates (1986), Russell, (1900), Nichols (2001). 
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Thoroughgoing analysis of eligible interpretations of the salva veritate criterion can be found 
in Mates (1986) – but however we choose to read the criterion, on every possible reading 
we speak of substitutivity43, hence a representation in terms of variables might work. But 
this is not the case with the PII. It should be noted that there is still a considerable gap 
between dealing with something as by itself substitutable and dealing with something as 
having its identity constituted in reference (through substitutivity of references) – not to 
mention dealing with something as having its identity given in a real determination. But for 
now let us put aside the idea of substitutivity and focus on the complementary part of the 
criterion: unchanged truth value. This presents the thing whose identity we scrutinize in the 
context of a proposition – and that in turn in the context of its possible truth values, or 
rather as ultimately referring to truth values44. On the other hand, when we investigate 
discernibility, things are evaluated solely in the context of themselves. But those are only 
preliminary observations – we must go through the evidence, in order to really appreciate 
the import of both tenets.  
 Leibniz usually formulates PII in the following manner: 
“there cannot be two individuals entirely similar or differing only in number” (L, 336) 
Keywords in this definition are: (i) individuals, (ii) entirely similar and (iii) differing only in 
number. As for (i), most of the wordings read “individuals” (individus)45, some of them 
“substances” (substances)46, some “things in nature”47 but once Leibniz choose the 
expression “real absolute beings” (etres reels absolus)48 only to change for “sensible things” 
(choses sensibles)49 a few lines later and eventually in the same writing (his fifth letter to 
Clarke) he even settled simply on “things” (choses)50. As concerns (ii), alternative phrases are 
                                                          
43 L, 241, 245, 371 
44 A distinctively Fregean move (Beaney, The Frege Reader: The foundations of Arithmetics), indeed, 
but still helpful, I believe, to pinpoint certain indispensable conceptual shifts involved in the phrasing. 
45 Leibniz alternates between “individuals” (L, 336, 687), or “individual things” (L, 268), or “real or 
complete individuals” (NE, 331-2) 
46 L, 308 (G, IV, 433); L, 534-5 (G, II, 264) 
47 “there are never two things in nature which are perfectly alike and in which it is impossible to find 
a difference that is internal or founded on an intrinsic denomination” (L, 645) 
48 L, 699: “there are not in nature two real, absolute beings, indiscernible from each other”  
(qu’il n’y a point dans la nature deux etres reels absolus indiscernables (G, VII, 393)) 
49 L, 699: “I said that in sensible things two that are indiscernible can never be found; that, for 
instance, two leaves in a garden or two drops of water perfectly alike are not to be found.” (J’avois 
allegué que dans les choses sensibles on n’en trouve jamais deux indiscernables (G, VII, 393)) 
50 L, 700 (G, VII, 395) 
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“resemble each other completely” (ressemblent entierement)51, “perfectly alike”52, “[not] 
different in nature” (diversae naturae)53 and “indiscernible from each other” 
(indiscernables)54. The last keyword remains unaltered in its wording throughout most of the 
statements.  
 2.3 The first keyword: the real being. The first keyword pertains predominantly to the 
scope of the PII. Most of the texts dealing with the issue of the range of PII’s application – 
either more or less independently of Leibniz’s original account55, or directly interpreting 
Leibniz56 – are impaired by the preoccupation with a talk about properties, seeking the 
adequate restriction of the scope of PII by way of restricting properties allowed to be used in 
discriminating the things submitted to the principle: routinely relations are excluded 
(though, a version known as the Third Grade Principle excludes for example only symmetric 
relations57). However, such understanding requires knowledge of all the properties, before 
applying PII to establish the identity of the subject bearing them – but this is absurd. In the 
real world, where the principle is used by Leibniz, all the properties of something real can 
never be known – and we generally never ask whether this drop of water is identical with 
that drop of water, because the answer is already implied: obviously not. So the appropriate 
range of PII’s application should not be determined in terms of delimiting permissible 
properties, which can never be known in advance, but rather in terms of the stipulated 
reality of a subject submitted to PII.  
                                                          
51 L, 308: “it is not true that two substances can resemble each other completely and differ only in 
number” (qu’il n’est pas vray que deux substances se ressemblent entierement, et soyent differentes 
solo numero (G, IV, 433)) 
52 NE, 331-332: “In a word, we shall never find the final logical species, as I have already remarked 
above, and two real or complete individuals of one and the same species are never perfectly alike.” 
53 L, 534-5: “all substances are different in nature, and there are no two things in nature which differ 
in number alone.” (omnes substantias esse diversae naturae nec duo solo numero differentia in 
natura dari (G, II, 264)) 
54 As far as I know, Leibniz actually started using the word no earlier than in his correspondence with 
Clarke: L, 687, 699, 700 
55 Consider the standard debates beginning with Black (1952), Rescher (1955), O’Connor (1954); or its 
more contemporary logicist alternates: Bar-Elli (1982), Ketland (2006), Forrest (2016). Though, it is 
true that a significant part of it steers to a question of determining identity in physical space, which is 
somewhat independent of the properties based talk about differences. 
56 Notoriously expositions like Brandon C. (2017); but even Mates (1986), who approaches the 
problem from Leibnizian subject-predicate logical scheme, eventually ends up in excluding “extrinsic 
denominations” with an addition that those are what “some philosophers now call relational 
properties” (Mates, 1986, 135) 
57 See Forrest (2016). 
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 Those who transliterate the principle in a formal logical fashion sketched above (and 
therefore conflate it virtually with the salva veritate criterion, or at least with a half of it) 
might fancy its use in the realm of abstract, mathematical, logical, or generally structurally 
determined entities (we will expand on the account later on); however, that is exactly the 
application which we can without a doubt rule out straight from the beginning. All of 
Leibniz’s efforts to arrive at sound definitions of similarity, equality and homogeneity (a 
pinnacle of those being without a doubt The Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics (L, 
666-674)) would otherwise go in vain58. Furthermore, Leibniz himself makes it pretty clear in 
his first systematic exposition of the idea in the First Truths: 
“It follows also that there cannot be two individual things in nature which differ only 
numerically. […] Never are two eggs, two leaves, or two blades of grass in a garden to be 
found exactly similar to each other. So perfect similarity occurs only in incomplete and 
abstract concepts, where matters are conceived, not in their totality but according to a 
certain single viewpoint, as when we consider only figures and neglect the figured matter. So 
geometry is right in studying similar triangles, even though two perfectly similar material 
triangles are never found. And although gold or some other metal, or salt, and many liquids, 
may be taken for homogeneous bodies, this can be admitted only as concerns the senses 
and not as if it were true in an exact sense.” (L, 268)  
A symptomatic use of triangle example makes the comparison with a typical presentation of 
the salva veritate criterion somehow striking: 
“Same or coincident terms are those which can be substituted for each other anywhere 
without affecting truth. For example, ‘triangle’ and ‘trilateral’, for in all the propositions 
demonstrated by Euclid about a triangle, trilateral can be substituted, and the converse, 
without affecting their truth.” (L, 371)  
The question whether Leibniz meant two concepts to be the same, or rather things denoted 
by them, which Mates tries to resolve, seems to me completely artificial59; what is important 
is that it clearly cannot be the case that PII would be as if a half60 of the salva veritate 
criterion, because those principles are mutually exclusive, incapable of application to the 
same subject. Mates indicates that PII should be restricted to complete concepts and I 
generally espouse such a view, even though the qualification might turn out to be quite void, 
“nominal” to put it in Leibniz words, since we do not have full access to any complete 
concept and this therefore cannot be properly represented by any part of our language: 
boldly stated in a more exegetic manner, one can say that no fully determined singular 
                                                          
58 An observation made explicit in Cook (2000). 
59 As will be vindicated further: see especially footnote 61. 
60 Actually I think that Leibniz meant by both principles something like biconditional, or simply did not 




reference to a complete individual concept is ever feasible for a finite mind. This being so, I 
find it more convenient to delimit the scope of PII negatively first: PII does not hold where 
the salva veritate criterion holds – i. e. in the cases of reference by means of incomplete 
concepts. These cases comprise not only reference to geometrical figures (such as 
triangles61), their homogeneous medium (such as space), mathematical objects in general 
(all of which deliberately violate PII by their very definition: consisting of either discrete or 
continuous repetition or multiplication of the same62), but all universals as well and 
ultimately all the concepts, whose account can be given in full, or, which amounts to the 
same, all the things which can be fully determined by their concept in a finite mind. The 
question of whether we speak more about the concepts themselves or rather about what is 
being conceptualized therewith is of a subsidiary nature (see footnote 61) and in fact Leibniz 
switches between a talk about concepts and a talk about what is being conceptualized quite 
freely, which perplexed many commentators and ultimately led them to accusations of use-
mention confusion, despite acknowledging that Leibniz on other occasions showed to be 
well aware of the distinction.  
 A subject of the aforementioned kind seems well suited for the salva veritate 
criterion, since in its application we proceed from knowledge of truth values of certain 
propositions to knowledge of identity of its terms: and so we unequivocally determine the 
identity of the terms in question by their relations to other concepts. A full account of the 
incomplete concept can be given, but this, however fully determining within certain 
conceptual scheme, is nevertheless indeterminate, because its identity is merely relative 
                                                          
61 The difference between the first and the second usage of the word “triangle” in the two quoted 
passages is worth noting: whereas the first speaks about a triangle more as a geometrical figure, the 
second speaks more about its concept – though what is being identified in the end cannot be this 
concept (because in this respect “triangle” and “trilateral” should differ and moreover, as Mates 
points out, the propositions would be the same, if they comprised the same concepts, and no 
substitution of termini would ever take place). It can be taken as evidence, that no strict distinction 
between concepts and geometrical figures or other abstract entities denoted by those concepts 
should be invoked at this point: the borderline separates not the concept and the conceptualized, 
but rather the real and its representation by a finite mind. 
62 Russell (1900) based his critique of Leibniz’s purportedly self-defeating use of PII precisely on the 
fact that for Leibniz extension “is nothing but a certain [continuous] repetition of things in so far as 
they are similar or indiscernible” (Russell, 1900, 102; my emphasis) and correlatively number would 
be nothing but a certain discrete repetition of things in so far as they are indiscernible – which 
eventually, according to Russell, rules out the possibility that there is more than one substance. We 
shall examine the claim later on, but a qualification is to be made right now: Leibniz repeatedly 
stresses that “it is wrong to confuse extension with what is extended” (L, 667) and strictly 




with respect to other incomplete concepts. Such a thing cannot be conceived in itself, but 
only in relation, which Leibniz makes clear to de Volder with respect to extension: 
“I do not think that substance is constituted by extension alone, since the concept of 
extension is incomplete. Nor do I think that extension can be conceived in itself, but I 
consider it an analyzable and relative concept, for it can be resolved into plurality, 
continuity, and coexistence or the existence of parts at one and the same time.” (L, 516) 
By “analysable” Leibniz means subject to finite analysis – as compared to concrete things, 
which can, of course, and routinely are analysed as well, but a finite mind can never reach a 
bottom: “the more we analyse things, the more they satisfy our intellect” (L, 516). By 
“relative” he means dependent on those defining concepts (i. e. in this case: plurality, 
continuity and coexistence), which in turn involve in their respective definitions yet another 
concepts, many of those involvements being reversible (as e. g. “substance and accident 
equally involve and are involved in each other” (L, 519)), without there being any 
unanalysable predicates (“Nor do I find any entirely absolute predicates in concepts, that is, 
any which do not involve connections with other predicates.” (L, 528)) and eventually: “it is 
neither necessary nor easy to arrive at concepts of ultimate simplicity” (L, 526)63. The quoted 
                                                          
63 This might indicate a remarkable departure from his former views apparently entailing a possibility 
of arriving at certain simple terms, from which all the other concepts (and therewith truths: true 
propositions comprising subject-predicate structure, where the predicate is involved in the subject, i. 
e. in the end complex concepts again) would arise by certain arithmetic operation. In fact even as 
late as in Monadology Leibniz mentions that: “When a truth is necessary, the reason for it can be 
found by analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and truths until we reach the primitive” (L, 
646). But “the primitive” in this case must be the merely relative constituent notion of a complex 
incomplete concept, which is being analysed (as for the extension those components were plurality, 
continuity and coexistence). The evidence is at least inconclusive and thoroughgoing investigation 
into it would lead us too far from our task, but I am inclined to believe that Leibniz shifted the 
emphasis from logic and category studies to somehow more naturalistic (and at the same time more 
“structural”) grounding of metaphysics in the second half of nineties (as exemplified e. g. in On the 
Correction of Metaphysics and the Concept of Substance (1694)) and therewith, if not entirely 
abandoned, then at least largely suppressed the idea of hierarchy of concepts for the last time at 
length expounded in On Universal Synthesis and Analysis, or the Art of Discovery (1679(?)) in favour 
of a more horizontal organization of interrelated terms, none of which is truly primitive, which suited 
better his “democratized” ontology, where principles of unity and spontaneous action are granted 
not only to human souls, but to inhuman and seemingly unanimated matter as well. Moreover, 
Mates (1986, 59) wonders how an infinity of things can be achieved by combination of finitely many 
primitive concepts and I think that Leibniz must have realized this and exactly for that reason 
switched for an infinity of complete individual concept as an ultimate grounding of semantic regress 
instead. I deem the idea of a horizontal mirroring structure to be in strict opposition to the 
hierarchized traditional one and Leibniz to really invent, develop and multiply apply on various 
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passage from the First Truths already claimed this relativity of incomplete concepts: “where 
matters are conceived, not in their totality but according to a certain single viewpoint” (L, 
268). Their relativization with respect to a certain conceptual scheme manifests itself as a 
relativization with respect to a particular viewpoint: a perspective abstracting from what 
makes things truly concrete, truly singular, differentiated from all others independently of 
any particular viewpoint, differentiated in itself, differentiating itself by its own activity, by 
its own expressing itself in the others: in a word, real. However, the perspectival 
relativization entails yet another significant feature: “perfect similarity [which] occurs only in 
incomplete and abstract concepts”. If we apprehend incomplete concepts universally not 
only as negatively determined by one another, instituting differential relations between 
themselves, but positively determining as well, instituting relations of perfect similarity, we 
can finally make sense of them being substitutable: incomplete concepts positively 
determine themselves by multiplication in equivalent representations.  
 By contrast, in the application of PII we proceed from represented identity to a real 
difference – in the reverse order compared to the salva veritate criterion. We submitted two 
different terms, e. g. triangle and trilateral, to the salva veritate criterion, realizing that “in 
all the propositions demonstrated by Euclid about a triangle, trilateral can be substituted, 
and the converse, without affecting their truth” (L, 371), to institute an identity of a 
transcendent object64 – relative to evaluation of geometrical propositions and achievable in 
singular reference by the two terms. It is somehow superfluous, or even misleading and 
harmful, to speculate whether this transcendent object is a mere concept or something else 
as well: its reality is fully determined by the possible references to it by means of those 
substitutable terms – and nothing more is needed to be added. But the point is that this 
determination of reality, even in its total, is still not complete, does not entail every 
eventuality, does not entail everything – and therefore does not render the thing ultimately 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
problems the former one, while, pace  Palkoska (2010), discarding the latter one on the way at best 
as an once convenient, now superfluous scaffolding.  
64 Bar-Elli (1982) argues to the effect that it is precisely PII (not the salva veritate criterion, explicitly 
considered by Bar-Elli as well), which is responsible for the formation of the notion of object in a 
particular language, or its “ontology”, rendering these objects transcendent to the language. But the 
very opening line of his article clearly indicates the nature of a conceptual shift involved in his 
representation of the principle: whereas Leibniz writes “there cannot be two individuals entirely 
similar or differing only in number” (L, 336), Bar-Elli states that: “The principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles says that two things that are indiscernible – that share all their properties – are one 
and the same thing.” Furthermore, he relies on the identity as constituted in singular reference only 
throughout the reasoning, cashing out indiscernibility in terms of equality in one semantics (I) and 




real. On the other hand, by submitting a drop of water (which, being a “drop of water”, is by 
definition similar to other drops of water) to PII, we establish a supposition of its intrinsic 
uniqueness as a guideline for an infinite analysis65. In this respect PII looks more like a 
heuristic criterion: we can hardly begin with a perfect grasp of two complete individual 
concepts only to realize a moment later that they are actually the same and therefore the 
things they express must be the same as well; rather we gradually complete our account of 
something supposedly real in the course of forthgoing analysis and the principle tells us that 
whenever we settle on a definite conceptualisation, which would fully determine the 
identity of the thing solely by means of conceptual determination, we already withdraw our 
initial supposition of the reality of the analysed object, which is therewith inevitably 
superseded by its idealization; it teaches us that behind every identification of 
representations, we should search for a real difference.  
 Leibniz famously invokes the principle in his discussion with Clarke (L, 675-721) to 
refute the reality of space: he does not argue to the effect that to comply with PII a “real 
space” should not be homogenous, but rather that space cannot be conceived of otherwise 
and therefore cannot be anything over and above the perfectly homogeneous geometrical 
space of mathematicians, cannot introduce any change, any difference, any heterogeneity66 
into the real world, cannot manifest itself (does nothing, is nothing67) – and therefore cannot 
be real. We could mean by “space” various things, but once we defined it as homogenous, 
we straightforwardly rule out the possibility for it to be something real. This touches upon a 
                                                          
65 Leibniz distinguishes two types of analysis, both of them proceeding „from the posterior by nature 
to the prior by nature“: an analysis of necessities, which reaches the ground level of primitive 
(though merely relative) elements  in finitely many steps, and an analysis of contingents, which 
“proceeds to infinity without ever being reduced to primitive elements” (L, 664). 
66 “I have in fact demonstrated elsewhere, in my reply to Sturm which was published in the Leipzig 
Acts, that if matter were not heterogeneous (which it becomes through the entelechies), there could 
arise no variety of phenomena, and as a result equivalents would always replace each other.” (L, 525)  
See also: L, 529 and 505. 
67 “It can be shown adequately from the essential principles of metaphysics that what does not act 
does not exist” (G, VII, 326-327) (translation taken from: L, 271, n.10) Moreover, what is ultimately 
real is a substance (everything else has its being dependent on some substance) and Leibniz 
occasionally even defines substance by activity: the opening line of The Principles of Nature and of 
Grace, based on reason for example reads: “1. Substance is a being capable of action.” (L, 636)  
“So far as I have made the concept of action clear to myself, I believe that there follows from it and is 
established by it that most widely accepted principle of philosophy — that actions belong to 
substances [actiones esse suppositarum]. And hence I hold it also to be true that this is a reciprocal 
proposition, so that not only is everything that acts an individual substance but also every individual 
substance acts without interruption, not excepting body itself, in which no absolute rest is ever to be  
found.” (L, 502) 
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common root of both Leibniz’s phenomenalism, as highlighted by Adams (1999), and 
nominalism, as stressed by Mates (1986), and inevitably steers our attention to the second 
keyword.  
 2.4 The second keyword: discernibility. The second keyword pertains to the nature of 
the stipulated real difference. On the one hand, as “discernible” it seems to be dependent 
on some perceiving subject (this is the “phenomenalistic” side), on the other hand, as 
intrinsic it seems not to result from any particular relation holding between differentiated 
objects, but rather to be some strange difference independent of any differentiating, 
difference in itself68, or a difference for itself (this is the “nominalistic” side). Separate study 
of either of those sides leads to tantalizing difficulties: the phenomenalistic accent opens 
questions of whether monads are to be differentiated from their own perspectives, or 
whether they are ultimately discernible only by God’s eye, and whether the principle is 
contingent, or necessary; whereas the nominalistic accent poses a challenge of making sense 
of such radical idealisation of relations to the effect that even a difference between subjects 
of denominations (be it intrinsic or extrinsic), their very identity, cannot be instituted by any 
purely extrinsic denomination69, any underlying structure (which taken as ultimately real 
would individuate the subjects by locating them in different positions70). I believe that the 
solution to those perplexities is to be sought in an acknowledgement that the two sides are 
not substantially different: they are only two incomplete conceptualizations of one and the 
same tendency in Leibniz’s thinking, and in the end of the day, Leibniz’s purported 
nominalism is nothing more and nothing less than his phenomenalism.  
 Let us have a look at those perplexities separately first. Commentators routinely 
could not help expressing dissatisfaction with the way Leibniz himself presents PII: it is 
usually considered that “Leibniz should have regarded his principle as necessary” (Russell, 
1900, 55) and that: “Were the gentleman to whom Leibniz refers in an anecdote71 from the 
                                                          
68 Leibniz makes it clear that differeing things “must have within themselves some diversity that can 
be noted” (L, 529) and speaks in such cases of an “intrinsic difference” (L, 532), or a “difference that 
is internal or founded on an intrinsic denomination” (L, 645). 
69 If we stick to the distinciton between properties and relations – and even if we enrich the scheme by 
relational properties – the matter become contentios and it is unlclear if we are really to charge Leibniz with an 
attempt to reduce all relations to properties – after all, he acknowledged as genuine relations of 
representation, which only enables any such reduction, but he clearly states that there are no „purely extrinsic 
denominations“ (L, 268, 269, 526) and I hope that my rendering in terms of structures rather than relations will 
prove to be better suited to Leibniz original intentions. 
70 Such as in an absolute space – but generally for example even a total order would suffice: 
rendering one monad to be the first, another one to be the second, etc. 
71 „An ingenious gentleman of my acquaintance, discoursing with me in the presence of Her Electoral 
Highness, the Princess Sophia, in the garden of Herrenhausen, thought he could find two leaves 
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Clarke correspondence to have found two leaves in a garden ‘perfectly alike’, that discovery 
would not imply the falsity of PII.” (Nichols, 2001, 192) But if what Leibniz wrote to Clarke 
was to be just an irrelevant “anecdote”, one wonders, why he concludes it with the claim: 
“Two drops of water or milk, viewed with a microscope, will appear distinguishable from 
each other. This is an argument against atoms, which are confuted, as well as a vacuum, by 
the principles of true metaphysics.” (L, 687) Moreover, in his next letter, he expressly states: 
“I said that in sensible things two that are indiscernible can never be found; that, for 
instance, two leaves in a garden or two drops of water perfectly alike are not to be found.” 
(L, 699; [my underline]) and as early as in the First Truths he formulates the principle in a 
similar fashion: “Never are two eggs, two leaves, or two blades of grass in a garden to be 
found exactly similar to each other. So perfect similarity occurs only in incomplete and 
abstract concepts…” (L, 268; [my underline]) Though it is generally true that PII pertains to 
substances, i. e. complete individual concepts, as Mates put it, we can never have a full 
intellectual (conceptual) grasp of those and what we eventually apply PII to (as a heuristic 
criterion) are really “sensible things” only.  
 Various attempts have been made to weaken the necessity of the principle. So Bar-
Elli (1982) claims it to be a priori, but not analytic, Russell (1900) wants it to be necessary, 
however not of a logical necessity, but a metaphysical one: he points to the passage where 
Leibniz ponders a scenario contradicting the principle and founds it indeed “possible”, but 
“contrary to the divine wisdom by which nothing is admitted without a reason” (L, 699, 700) 
and deems this, as well as the relevant article of the Discourse on Metaphysics (L, 308), to 
stand for a deduction of PII from the Law of Sufficient Reason, which is metaphysically 
necessary, rendering PII metaphysically necessary as well. The very same textual evidence, 
however, serves Mates (1986) to prove the principle to be a “contingent truth”72 and 
Strawson (1959) to consider the principle “theological”. A very compelling alternative is 
given in Hacking (1975): “Like the Principle of Sufficient Reason, I/I [=PII] is not true in each 
possible world. It is true about all possible worlds. It is a metaprinciple about possible 
descriptions.” (Hacking, 1975, 255) The comparison with logical necessity is striking: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
perfectly alike. The princess defied him to do it, and he ran all over the garden a long time to look for 
some; but it was to no purpose.” (L, 687) 
72 Though the precise nature of contingency in Leibniz is a contentious matter – see Adams (1999) for 
an exhaustive discussion of Leibniz views on contingency. Clearly, Russell wants the principle to be a 
priori – i. e. not empirical, not derived, or in principle derivable from any observation, nor refutable 
by it – whereas, by contrast, Mates acknowledges that “Leibniz seems to accept the relevance of 
empirical procedures like peering through the microscope at drops of water or hunting in the garden 
for pairs of exactly similar leaves.” (Mates, 1986, 134) But how far would he venture into insisting 
that this “grand principle of reason” (L, 700) “changing the state of metaphysics” (L, 687) holds of the 
same contingency as factual truths? 
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“Tractatus 3.031 reminds us: ‘It used to be said that God could create anything except what 
would be contrary to the laws of logic. The reason being that we could not say what an 
‘illogical’ world would look like.’ Leibniz replaces ‘could not say’ by ‘would not say’. That is, 
Leibniz could not describe a world in which a law of logic was false and would not describe 
any world in such a way that it contravenes I/I. Whatever God might create, we are clever 
enough to describe it in such a way that the identity of indiscernibles is preserved.” (Hacking, 
1975, 255-6) The emphasis on language is of course anachronistic, but the point behind it 
remains: it is completely upon us what we consider to be the same: the possibility to think of 
it as really different is always open to us. But to render the things the same means making 
them into substitutable representations as determined within some merely relative 
representational scheme and therewith losing the ultimately real subject. The imperative, 
embodied in PII, viz. to search for an intrinsic difference, is the imperative to search for a real 
determination, as contrasted with the merely relative one – it is an imperative of a true 
metaphysics: to investigate what are the things “in themselves”. If the principle is not 
logically necessary, but is nevertheless an a priori fundamental principle of reason, despite 
not pertaining to a priori objects, one cannot come up with any other way of demonstrating 
it than by its application. And I can hardly conceive of a more convincing demonstration of 
its force and utility than this leaves-on-a-tree example. Relevant estimates ascribe up to 2 
million leaves to a fully grown oak tree. When I look at the tree, those leaves look pretty 
much alike, but I suppose that there are some differences between them, in fact I imagine 
those differences to result from some principle of variation: I can think of this part being 
smaller, that part bigger, this part lighter, that part darker, but I can never conceptualize a 
principle of differentiation rendering 2 million leaves completely unique. And then I look at 
the entire forest; and think of all the myriads of leaves growing anew every year. I am 
perfectly sure, the experience has testified this conviction countless times (and what other 
means of testifying it are there?), that any two random leaves I pick will be easily discernible 
even by a naked eye, nevertheless there is no chance for me to come up with a principle of 
identification, which would yield such richness of forms. I am left with only one option: to 
simply posit the individuality, or uniqueness of every single leaf prior to any attempt at its 
determination. I find this to be a pretty forceful argument to the effect that there is to be 
genuine individuality everywhere in nature, just as there is genuine individuality among 
human souls.  
 This once again shows how misguided it is to cash out indiscernibility in terms of 
having the same properties. The reality of our object must be presupposed in the first place 
– this entails individuality, which in turn entails an intrinsic difference, which may only 
eventually be determined by distinct properties (though in God’s mind everything is present 
immediately at once). But even if discernibility is not relative to a particular abstracting or 
idealizing point of view of a particular conceptual scheme, it still seems to be dependent on 
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a perspective of an individual monad (a discerning human mind in particular). Nichols (2001) 
claims the “discernibility” in PII to be dependent exclusively on a God’s eye perspective, but 
this repeats the flaw of those cashing it out in terms of properties and those restricting PII to 
complete individual concepts taken in themselves (i. e. as solely God manage – as compared 
to taking them in relation to us, from our point of view, in our perception of them): this 
would make the principle completely void. For of what use would it be for us to know that 
God might discriminate between things between which we cannot, and even in principle 
could not ever discriminate, if we had no clue as to which those for us indiscernible non-
identities are? We would perceive some ultimately indiscernible phenomena, harbouring 
presumption that between some of them God would discriminate, while between others 
not, because they are in fact representations of one and the same substance – but for us all 
the cases would be ultimately indiscernible. This is a completely arbitrary and superfluous 
hypothesis. There cannot be any ultimately indiscernible perceptions. What makes us think 
otherwise and gives credibility to a fictitious scenario of having indiscernible yet different 
perceptions is a naïve identification of numerical difference with a difference of spatial 
locations ascribed to contents of our representations, but it is haywire to think so, as will be 
shown in a next section – and besides, space and time are only abstractions derived from 
differences of perceptions, which therefore must precede, not the other way round. 
Moreover, we rendered the principle at the outset of our enquiry as claiming equality of two 
structures (be they semantic or real), and in whichever reading I can conceive of, PII must at 
least initially presuppose some conceptual difference between numerical identity and 
discernibility (even if the difference between numerical identity and indiscernibility is 
eventually denied); but how could we conceptualize the difference which we cannot 
approach? What else would then the principle state over and above the God’s omniscience? 
All this seems to me ridiculous. PII obviously speaks about discernibility, which is completely 
open to our view: “…all substances are different in nature, and there are no two things in 
nature which differ in number alone. When such a thing is conceived, it is by a fiction of the 
mind which is ignorant of the difference or is concealing it, or abstracting from it.” (L, 534-5) 
When we institute a similarity between two distinct leaves, it is not due to us being 
completely unaware of the difference, which is manifest, but rather due to (i) a fiction of our 
mind determining similarity and (ii) our incapability to render the difference, which is real, 
determinate.  
 Nichols’ interpretation is an attempt to address a difficulty posed by Strawson (1959) 
to the effect that monads cannot be uniquely individuated by their points of view, because 
the universe can be symmetric – but this idea does not need any refutation, as it 
straightforwardly twists Leibniz’s scheme upside down. Strawson first presupposes a 
structure of the world and then shows that positions on this structure does not uniquely 
determine individuality of the elements occupying them. However, this is what structures 
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generally do, this is what they are good for: rendering their elements to be substitutable. To 
be sure, there are many structures which are rigid, i. e. devoid of any nontrivial 
automorphisms (but for some strange reason Strawson chooses exactly those nonrigid ones, 
such as chessboard), nevertheless even those form isomorphism classes and cannot 
therefore uniquely determine identity of the elements occupying the positions within them 
(hence the problem of a massive reduplication posed by Strawson). And nobody was more 
consistent in maintaining that structure is not sufficient for complete determination or 
individuation than Leibniz himself who holds that “there is no denomination so extrinsic that 
it does not have an intrinsic denomination as its basis” (L, 526-7). So in Leibniz’s universe the 
order is reverse, there is no underlying structure posited, only intrinsic differences, which by 
themselves already individuate the monads, i. e. immediately for themselves structure their 
plurality on the first level, and upon those all the other structures supervene. But how 
should it work? To answer this we must steer our attention to the third keyword. 
 2.5 The third keyword: numerical identity. There is a significant strand of thinking 
about PII which focuses on devising spatial counterexamples and subsequently resisting 
them by offering equivalent redescriptions, which would not violate PII73. We already 
encountered Hacking (1975) providing a critique of them all in general, concluding that they 
are question-begging and suggesting that the possibility to give a PII-conform description is 
always open and, given certain metaphysical presuppositions, might be preferable. In the 
course of his reasoning, however, two remarkable observations are executed: 1. “The 
examples are ‘underdetermined’” (Hacking, 1975, 249) as “there can be no determination of 
spatial relations without a study of the laws of nature attributed to objects in space.” 
(Hacking, 1975, 250), which he illustrates by Mach’s relativistic answer to Newton’s rotating 
bucket argument. 2. “To avoid question-begging we must first show that there are two 
drops, or first show, on independent grounds, that absolute space exists.” (Hacking, 1975, 
251-2)  
 The first observation can be still expanded: a description of a fictitious scenario is by 
definition given merely in abstract terms, incomplete concepts, hence it cannot boast a real 
difference between depicted objects – PII is violated even if under an alternative description 
it seems to hold. The second observation is analogous to the conclusion rendered by a 
person A in Black’s original dialogue: “Of course, if you began by assuming that the spheres 
were numerically different though qualitatively alike, you could end by ‘providing’ what you 
first assumed.” (Black, 1952, 163) We must represent the scenario in a way which not only 
opens the possibility of describing the depicted objects as numerically distinct, but explicitly 
determines the numerical difference as well. The determination is achieved by representing 
                                                          
73 A pioneering article was Black‘s The Identity of Indiscernibles (1952). Forrest (2016) gives a nice 
overview of various approaches to PII based on those spatial counterexamples.  
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the objects as occupying different positions in a postulated structure. And the structure is 
rendered therewith as real. Routinely an absolute space is used: two74 in itself indiscernible 
objects are placed in some distance from one another in an absolute space to determine 
their numerical distinctness; then a re-description is offered conforming to the notion of 
numerical distinctness defined in terms of occupying different positions on a spatial 
structure, which aims to redefine a topology of the presupposed space so as to render the 
corresponding positions to be one and the same75. Numerical identity is therewith bound 
with a position in a spatial structure – and if the positions collapse into one, numerical 
identities collapse as well. This looks somehow arbitrary: it seems that we could have chosen 
other structures to render the objects non-identical – and besides, it may be suggested that 
space itself presupposes numerical difference, not the other way round.  
 Nevertheless, however we describe a scenario comprising two objects, an abstract 
structure responsible for the plurality of the objects – and therewith responsible for the 
singularity of every one of them taken separately – will already be given in this description. 
By putting forward a re-description we posit an alternative structure of the same kind or 
quality in which we ascribe one and the same position to both of the objects within the 
original description. What do we mean by the “same kind or quality”? The structures should 
be rendered homogeneous, in a broader sense, perhaps even a continuous transformation is 
to be defined between them, yet the specification is even stronger: if we presupposed a real 
absolute space, its re-description should represent a real absolute space as well – with not 
only homogenous structural properties, but with genuinely qualitative properties evincing 
reality of the spatial structure as well – taking into account a possible observer, who could 
judge the objects to be really two, or really one. However, even if the mutual determination 
of the elements in either of the structures is to be rendered ultimately real, the 
determination of the structures by one another is semantic76: the identity of the single 
object in one position of the new structure is determined in reference to the two objects in 
the original structure. We cannot easily discard the previous description, because it 
                                                          
74 Sophisticated counterexamples may use more indiscernible objects instead – even an infinity of 
them. Nevertheless, everything I say in the subsequent is without loss of generality applicable to 
those cases as well.  
75 Although some of the redescriptions of the more complex scenarios comprising more indiscernible 
objects are pretty elaborate to be intrinsically “indiscernible” from the original one, it is worth noting 
that there are no determinate criteria of this intrinsic indiscernibility. Since there are no other fixed 
points in the structure than those multiple positions which eventually become one, it is hard to tell 
which additional features do we expect the structure to boast except discriminating the objects (plus 
possibly the shortest (and/or straight) path between them) and by which operations we are allowed 
to establish that it retains them even under the new description.  
76 A distinction developed at the outset of this chapter. 
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constituted not only the numerical difference between the indiscernible objects, but also the 
singular identity of each of them, which is transmitted by means of reference to the single 
object under the new description.  
 Absolute space proved to be quite convenient for grounding numerical identity, yet a 
suspicion has been raised that the identity it renders is more than numerical. What exactly is 
this “more” involved in spatially defined numerical identity? And how does the minimal 
structure of numerical identity and difference relations look like? A straightforward answer 
might read: a structure of natural numbers. However, this could, in a sense, be too much (it 
is clear, that we wanted two distinct things to be really two, but it is less clear that we 
insisted that many distinct things be, for example, exactly 1098, or that we insisted that 
these many things be countable and necessarily more, equal, or less than those many 
things), in another sense, too little (we definitely wanted those two things to be really two – 
not just theoretically, abstractly speaking, or in a certain respect, from a certain point of 
view, two). Indeed, it is hard to conceive that all the objects would instead be located in an 
absolute three-dimensional space in an absolute natural number line. Be it as it may, it 
makes hardly any difference, since for Leibniz the former is no more real than the latter. The 
only acceptable, or ultimately real, structure is the intrinsic structure of a simple unity. 
Substance as a unity per se needs to be determined by some minimal structure responsible 
for its numerical identity and yet not external to it. 
  How to diminish the specific impact of the structure, chosen arbitrarily only to 
render the things two? We pondered the notion of intrinsic difference in the previous 
section – but this does not seem to be a viable option for the present task: to “render the 
things two” is expressly to ascribe a number to them and the ascription of a number is an 
extrinsic denomination. No intrinsic denomination can do the job: by this we take something 
as something and once again something as something – and indeed there is an intrinsic 
difference rendering every one of our acts of referring unique, but lest we take something as 
one, we cannot establish its numerical identity. However, once we take something as one, 
we no longer take it as something specific, we no longer refer to it by means of intrinsic 
denomination and determine its identity in this unique act of reference, but rather let it be 
determined in an external structure. Even if intrinsic denominations differentiate the things, 
they are not sufficient to render them countable, or generally structured. For the things to 
“differ only in number” (L, 268, 308, 336, 535, 700)77 means being identified merely in an 
external structure grounding their countability – and so we will need to presuppose one, in 
order to establish their numerical identity.  
                                                          
77 It is worth noting that this is precisely the formulation Leibniz usually chooses. Leibniz was well 
aware of a peculiar nature of numerical difference. 
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 Things differentiated “in themselves” do not form a single whole78, nor a determined 
multiplicity (because their numerical identity is not given). If we were to speak about 
multiplicity nevertheless, we should call it a heterogeneous multiplicity79. What is peculiar 
about such heterogeneous multiplicity is the absence of any common measure, any principle 
of identity external to the elements themselves – enabling the elements to be carved out 
from the background of the whole of the multiplicity: you cannot single out and extract an 
individual element from heterogeneous multiplicity, because the elements are individuated 
intrinsically and so there is no common structure in which they could border with one 
another, or delimit one another: by taking a single element, you take the entire multiplicity. 
And correspondingly, even the whole of the multiplicity lacks any extrinsic delimitation of its 
numerical identity and so it can hardly be said to be self-identical – rather it is self-
differentiating with respect to every one of its uncountable aspects represented by its 
elements.  
 Leibniz himself provides us with various pretty Bergsonian sounding descriptions of 
such multiplicity, pertaining to two crucial types of pluralities in Leibniz, which are regularly 
at the charge of being ill defined: (i) a plurality of monadic states80 – criticised for leading to 
a bundle theory of substance, or a substratum theory of substance, or a presupposition of 
absolute time declaratively denied by Leibniz (see Whipple (2010)), (ii) a plurality of 
monads81 – criticised for being inconsistent with a conception of numerical denominations 
                                                          
78 For Leibniz a whole consists of parts, which are its homogeneous ingredients (L, 668). 
79 A term coined by Bergson (1888, 1939). Deleuze (2006) famously derived its origin from Riemann 
(2000), but I do not consider the evidence to be entirely convincing. Those are the basic 
characteristics of Bergson’s heterogeneous multiplicity: it is heterogeneous, continuous (resisting 
arithmetization), its elements flow into one another, each of them containing all the rest. Additional 
characteristics connected with it being a “structure” of duration include being in permanent advance, 
where a novelty protracts what already is by including, yet qualitatively transforming it.  
80 The passage is a bit longer, but definitely worth quoting in full length, because in its entirety it fully 
reveals the striking similarity with Bergson’s descriptions of consciousness: “An idea is, so to speak, 
something dead and unchangeable in itself, as is a figure; soul is rather something living and full of 
activity; and in this sense I do not say that it is any one idea which tends to change out of itself, but 
only various ideas succeeding each other, one of which can, however, be derived from another. But 
in another sense of the word, I could say that in some way the soul is a living or substantial idea or 
more correctly, that it is an 'ideating’ substance. Nor do I think that you intend anything else when 
you say that ideas act upon each other in representing each other, for I do not believe that you 
regard ideas as substances colliding with each other as do bodies.” (L, 520) 
81 “In my opinion there is nothing in the whole created universe which does not need, for its perfect 
concept, the concept of everything else in the universality of things, since everything flows into every 
other thing in such a way that if anything is removed or changed, everything in the world will be 
different from what it now is.” (L, 524; my emphasis) 
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being external and therefore not entirely real, abstractions of mind, relative, dependent on a 
point of view (see Russell (1900)). Those descriptions tend to dissolve rigid limitation, or 
separation of the elements of the multiplicity, which prima facie looks more plausible in the 
case of monadic states (i), than individual monads (ii), that are to form “true unities”, but 
one should bear in mind that this account expresses as if only a half of the truth about them. 
The second half is procured by their numerical identity. Bringing those two together – the 
union of the intrinsic and the extrinsic, the internalisation of structure – that is precisely 
what PII is entitled to establish.  
 Russell (1900) observed that PII presupposes both “difference of content” as well as 
numerical difference82 and for that reason deemed it to be self-contradictory: since the 
ascription of contents presupposes numerical differentiation of subjects of those ascriptions. 
His argument depends at least in part on a substratum theory of substance he attributes to 
Leibniz: before ascribing differentiating intrinsic denominations (i. e. properties), a plurality 
of subjects of predication (i. e. substances) must already be there – and a plurality inevitably 
entails a structure, or an extrinsic difference. Furthermore he came up with two 
interconnected arguments partially deduced thereof, to the effect that the objective 
plurality of substances is untenable: concluding that Leibniz should have ended up with a 
single substance83.  
 On the one hand, it would be way too hasty to deduce the singularity of the 
substance from the absence of a determination of plurality (as Russell himself partly admits): 
after all the very same principles (extrinsic denomination, or delimitation in a structure) are 
needed to render the substance singular, as already shown: in that case the substance would 
simply lack any numerical identity (though, it may still retain intrinsic, or qualitative 
identity84). On the other hand, Russell’s argument cuts even deeper, when he puts his finger 
on what is crucial for Leibniz: the world is divisible – and therefore is actually divided – it is 
                                                          
82 “The principle, so far from maintaining diversity of content alone, presupposes material or 
numerical diversity as well as diversity of content proper. To both these it is logically subsequent. […] 
This doctrine evidently presupposes both kinds of diversity, and asserts a relation between them.” 
(Russell, 1900, 55) 
83 With this upshot he closes the discussion of PII as well as his treatment of Leibniz’s solution to the 
labyrinth of the continuum. Though, in the end Russell seems to draw a conclusion to the effect that 
one substance is equally problematic as many substances – but this is a direct consequence of 
substratum theory of substance, which Russell ascribes to Leibniz and which, according to Russell, 
makes the term destitute of meaning. 
84 Compare it with the problem of non-count, or mass nouns expounded in the first chapter and the 
corresponding mode of reference.  
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definitely plural in its nature and this plurality is to be somehow built upon simple unities85; 
but if every determination of plurality is to be external denomination and as such merely 
relative (dependent on a determination of the entire extension, which is “an ideal thing”, 
delimited within a particular conceptual scheme86), or subjective (dependent on monadic 
perspectives), there is no room for a real (fully determined) plurality in the world as it is in 
itself: all the plurality is either an idealisation, or a phenomenon, but nothing in itself, 
nothing real. Russell is as penetrating as no one else here87 – and his argument loses nothing 
of its persuasiveness even if we transpose his talk of subjects, properties and relations into 
our notions of intrinsic and extrinsic (structural) determination. There cannot really be a 
plurality of monads – there cannot be even a single monad, as it seems after all. This looks 
indeed devastating. And yet completely consequent: every determinate plurality (be it three 
dimensional manifold of space, the real line, a set of two members, or a single self-identical 
unit) is just an incomplete concept – nothing real in itself. “Properties pertaining to 
extension are not to be assigned to souls, and their unity and multitude are not to be 
derived from the category of quantity but from the category of substance, that is, not from 
points but from the primitive force of action. But the action proper to the soul is perception, 
and the nexus of perceptions, according to which subsequent ones are derived from 
preceding ones, makes up the unity of the percipient.” (L, 599)88  
 Our difficulties are similar to those exposed at the outset of the first chapter (1.1). If 
there is a way out of this riddle, it lies in the direction already hinted at: the conjunction of 
the intrinsic and the extrinsic (the elements and the structure) demanded by PII is to be 
accomplished by a mirroring relation binding the intrinsic ever self-differentiating 
heterogeneous multiplicity of a monad taken in itself with the extrinsic self-identical 
homogenous plurality of monads taken in their relations as the world. There clearly cannot 
be any immediately determinate number of monads (not even a number “one”): their 
plurality must be mediated by a reflection into their intrinsic self-differentiation in such a 
way that every attempt to determine it is caught up in an infinite regress of reflections. The 
monad mirroring the entire universe is the fulfilment of PII. And so the upshot addresses 
                                                          
85 “Now I infer that where there is not even one thing that is a true being, there cannot be many 
beings and that every multitude presupposes a unity.” (L, 342) “There must be simple substances, 
since there are compounds, for the compounded is but a collection or, an aggregate of simples.” (L, 
643) “Now a multitude can derive its reality only from the true unities, which have some other origin 
and are entirely different from points, for it is certain that the continuum cannot be compounded of 
points.” (L, 454) See also: L, 456, 457. 
86 See 2.3. 
87 Russell, 1900, pp. 115-117. 
88 This confirms the definition of “true unities“ in (L, 454) as that “which have some other origin and 
are entirely different from points” foreshadowed already in 1.4.4.  
48 
 
doubts raised at the beginning of this chapter (2.1): all relations of identity and difference 
are indeed dependent on a particular point of view and cannot be conceived as abstracted 
thereof and taken as universally objective (because, after all, every determination of entities 
as objective is necessarily connected with an external delimitation of their numerical 
identity, which is merely relative), but since the world consist solely of those particular 
points of view, this differentiation and identification of monads for themselves constitutes 


































3. THE MIRRORING RELATION 
 
 For Leibniz, the fundamental ontological level comprises simple substances – 
monads: “true unities”89, which are the very “principles of diversity”90 by “expressing exactly 
each other”91 and therewith “expressing the universe from their own points of view”92. This I 
deem to be a paradigmatic formulation of Leibniz’s mature account of the monad with 
respect to its structural features. Moreover, I deem it to be a focal point of very much of his 
philosophising, at least in the later years, neither a logical consequent of ordinary 
superstitions disguised as irrefutable principles, nor any such purported principle itself, but 
rather a striking idea gradually dominating everything which in the virtual space of reasons 
surrounds it, eventually making Leibniz write to de Volder:  
“You seem to have rightly grasped my doctrine of how every body whatever expresses all 
other things, and how every soul or entelechy whatever expresses its own body and through 
it all other things. But when you have uncovered the full force of this doctrine, you will find 
that I have said nothing else which does not follow from it.” (June 20, 1703; L, 531) 
 
 3.1 Mirroring as semantic and real mutual determination. In the first chapter we 
established that the criteria for an entity to be identifiable in reference determine it insofar 
as it may stand for a constitutive element of a structure; mutual determination of such 
elements, therefore, mirrors mutual determination of their representations – and the 
numerical identity of an element is delimited within an underlying structure just as its 
identity in reference is delimited in its reference trace. In this way we conceived of a 
structure as an interpretation of a talk of certain multiplicity – rendering the determination 
in question as a semantic determination. However, we hinted at the possibility of a real 
determination among the elements, as well, yielding a real, ontological structure, which we 
further elaborated on in the second chapter. In order for the entities to exercise any 
influence upon one another, they cannot be completely heterogeneous, they must share 
some common ground on which to meet, there must be some underlying structure in which 
                                                          
89 The term “true unity” is regularly used at least from 1687 (see: L, 339, 454, 456, 529) and I choose 
it for being less loaded with scholastic connotations than its alternative “unity per se”. This latter 
term is a distinctive feature of a substance – as compared  to being merely a “unity per accident”, 
which for Leibniz ultimately amounts to being a unity per aggregation, i. e. a whole, or a fictional 
whole (the distinction between “wholes” and “fictional wholes” is comprehensively elaborated in 
Harmer (2014). 
90 “Entelechies must necessarily differ or not be completely similar to each other; in fact, they are 
principles of diversity, for they each express the universe from their own point of view.”(L, 530) 
91 See: Monadology, 59. (L, 648) 
92 See: L, 337, 347, 360, 457, 473, 530, 579, 637, 640, 659, 711, 712; Th, 286, 322. 
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their mutual influence can be delimited. Yet, structure is an abstraction from a specific 
content, nothing but extrinsic principle of determination – which in itself cannot be real. The 
reality lies in the vanishing point of an infinite analysis: perfect, fully determined singularity, 
completely heterogeneous to anything representable – intrinsically heterogeneous – 
differentiating itself in itself93. The only structure admissible as real is the one, which is both 
extrinsic and intrinsic at the same time – monadic structure, which is to account for the 
plurality of monads as well as singularity of every one of them separately. This is the minimal 
structure, or the simplest conceivable structure, because in order for its determining 
elements or principles to be determined, no external independent structure is needed – nor 
allowed for. By the same token, on the other hand, the structure is inscrutable, incapable of 
being made explicit, or fully represented – precisely because it is inseparable from its 
content. And so the mutual real determination of the ultimate entities cannot be anything 
like mutual interaction of bodies in a physical space, causal dependence linearly ordered in 
time, or mutual mixing of hues in a space of colours – or any such interaction delimited in an 
independent structure – but rather mere mutual representation without any further 
universally applicable qualification (all its qualifications are subject to a particular point of 
view of a particular monad). In order for something to exist, it must manifest itself somehow 
(2.3.), it must act: “Substance is a being capable of action.” (L, 636) – but its action is nothing 
but perception (L, 599): there is no objective, or independent reality of this action – if after 
all, the reality itself, whose essence is action, comprises nothing but points of view of its 
representations. Insofar as monads comprise the ultimate reality, they remain “windowless” 
(L, 643), because of being completely heterogeneous, in the sense that there is no external 
ground for their actions (they are fully spontaneous94), there is no independent structure, 
which could be taken as a measure of their interaction. Every kind of interaction and in 
general every kind of relation can be construed as a morphism, or mutual representation – 
mirroring – if an appropriate point of view is adopted: equality, or inequality pertains to 
representations and is always subject to a particular point of view, as suggested in 2.1. But 
there is no independent abstract space of points of view in Leibniz’s ontology: all and only 
points of view are the monads themselves.  
 3.1.1 Real mutual determination. On several occasions Leibniz considers real mutual 
determination of beings construed as spatiotemporal interaction of extended objects. He 
employs correspondent examples in two kinds of arguments: either (i) as an illustration of 
                                                          
93 Intrinsic heterogeneity of a “true unity”: “Everywhere there are simple substances actually 
separated from each other by their own actions, which continually change their relations.” (L, 636-
637) 
94 Compare: L, 325, 457, 493, 577. 
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influence exercised by anything whatsoever on everything there is95 (L, 269, 339, 637, 649), 
or (ii) as a basis of an argument to the effect that extension (and duration) is not sufficient to 
provide identity for extended objects within vacuum-free infinitely divisible mass (L, 505).  
 The crux of the first argument can be summed up thus: if there is something 
happening in one part of matter, then for it to really happen, to really be, it must be 
something – for something; i. e. it must manifest itself somehow (see 2.3): it must influence 
something, there must be something else happening in some other part of matter mirroring 
the change taking place here; but for there to be something happening, yet another 
manifestation is needed – else the two events would remain closed within an isolated 
system composed of the two correspondent parts of matter, meaning nothing to the rest of 
the world, meaning nothing to any conceivable observer (whose observation would not 
remain closed within the system as well). And so the chain of events spreads gradually to the 
farthest parts of the universe: one thing affects another, which affects yet another, etc. – 
and through all the intermediaries eventually everything mirrors everything.  
 But once we transpose this line of thought in a spatiotemporal scenario, several 
problems arise. For any change to occur in the first place some duration is already needed; 
and in the second place there is no such a thing as an immediate causal interaction. 
                                                          
95 “Every created individual substance exerts physical action and passion on all others. For if a change 
occurs in one, some corresponding change results in all others, because their denomination is 
changed. This is confirmed by our experience of nature, for we observe that in a vessel full of liquid 
(the whole universe is such a vessel) a motion made in the middle is propagated to the edges, though 
it may become more and more insensible as it recedes farther from its origin.” (L, 269)  
“… because of the continuity and divisibility of all matter, the slightest movement exerts its effect 
upon nearby bodies, and so from body to body to infinity, but in diminishing proportion. So our body 
must be affected in some way by the changes of all the rest.” (L, 339) 
“And since everything is connected because of the plenitude of the world, and each body acts on  
every other one more or less, depending on the distance, and is affected by its reaction, it follows 
that each monad is a living mirror, or a mirror endowed with an internal action, and that it 
represents the universe according to its point of view and is regulated as completely as is the 
universe itself.” (L, 637)  
“In this respect compound beings are in symbolic agreement with the simple. For everything is a 
plenum, so that all matter is bound together, and every motion in this plenum has some effect upon 
distant bodies in proportion to their distance, in such a way that every body not only is affected by 
those which touch it and somehow feels whatever happens to them but is also, by means of them, 
sensitive to others which adjoin those by which it is immediately touched. It follows that this 
communication extends to any distance whatever. As a result, every body responds to everything  
which happens in the universe, so that he who sees all could read in each everything that happens 
everywhere, and, indeed, even what has happened and will happen, observing in the present all that 
is removed from it, whether in space or in time.” (L, 649) 
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Therefore the mirroring in question cannot take place among mere spatial parts of an 
instantaneous extended mass: there is no congruence between unmoved instantaneous 
chunks of matter, there is only congruence of their motions. It seems simply misguided to 
conceive of the ultimate subjects, the ultimate agents as if carved out of space in one 
simultaneous slice of space-time. Moreover, if the only admissible change was locomotion of 
infinitely divisible vacuum-free homogeneous mass, the identity of what is being moved 
could be established neither in itself (since each part of the mass would be homogeneous 
with every other part), nor by the effects of the motion (since motion is nothing but 
perpetual substitution of indistinguishables) – and therefore the motion itself would be both 
locally and globally indiscernible from the rest. This is the crux of the second argument, by 
which Leibniz means to show that some intrinsic principle of differentiation among the 
ultimate subjects is needed, some heterogeneity, which in the context of such 
spatiotemporal scenario amounts to “active forces or impetuses” within moving chunks of 
matter. “For if there is no difference between any portion of matter and another portion 
equal and congruent to it (which the illustrious man must admit, since he has destroyed 
active forces or impetuses and all other qualities and modifications except for existence in 
this place and successively some future existence or other, all qualities and modifications 
having been removed), and furthermore, if the state of this matter at one moment does not 
differ from its state at another moment except through the transposition of equal and 
congruent portions of matter which agree in everything, it obviously follows that because of 
the perpetual substitution of indistinguishables, the state of the corporeal world can in no 
way be distinguished at different moments.” (L, 505)  
 Clearly enough, in terms of modern physics, the sole extension of bodies is not 
sufficient, vectors of momenta are needed as well; but the very dichotomy between bodies 
and their momenta looks arbitrary once we face philosophical problem of the fundamental 
ontology and indeed unsatisfactory even in physics, when we move from mechanics of a 
middle-sized objects to the scale of micro-particles. Moreover, Leibniz’s arguments should 
be read in their full generality as pertaining to any kind of mutual determination delimited in 
an independently determinable structure, yet conceived as real. In any such idealisation, we 
ultimately end up in more or less entangled regresses of determination, as expounded at the 
beginning of the first chapter. We need some homogeneity to account for joint effects of 
mutual determination of real entities, but at the same time, we need some heterogeneity to 
account for the real difference between the ultimate entities – be they carved out of a three-
dimensional Euclidean space, or any multidimensional vector space of modern physics. The 
(i) argument shows that between any two real entities, there is to be a morphism, but the (ii) 
argument shows that all the morphisms will ultimately become automorphisms in an 
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independently representable homogeneous structure of mutual determination, if we do not 
allow for some intrinsic principle of differentiation96.  
 3.1.2 Principles of self-differentiation. The riddle exposes clash between mirroring 
construed as mutual determination of elements within a closed system and mutual 
determination of real entities, which cannot be but conceived of as taking place in an open 
system, allowing the entities to transcend themselves, to shed their identity, to self-
differentiate. It is natural to think of this intrinsic self-differentiation as enabled by a 
superadded temporal dimension – prioritizing therewith time over space – and Leibniz 
himself did very little to denounce this preoccupation. In fact, Leibniz’s notion of monadic 
state perplexed many commentators, ultimately leading them to ascribe him either a bundle 
theory of substance (Mates, 1986), or a substratum theory of substance (Russell, 1900), or 
some middle ground struggling with an implicit asymmetry in his treatment of the ideality of 
space and the ideality of time – as comprehensively put forward by Whipple (2010). Though 
the evidence is less conclusive than one would wish, there are systematic reasons to 
discount any such asymmetry between space and time. Monadic change insofar as it is 
temporal, is merely a phenomenal change; and insofar as it is a-temporal, is only an intrinsic 
self-differentiation, which is no more connected with time, than it is with space, or any other 
ideal structure into which it may be projected. Monadic state is in this respect perfectly 
comparable to “situs”, which according to Leibniz (L, 667) involves both quantity and quality, 
or “location”:  
 “I had said that extension is the order of possible coexistents97 and that time is the 
order of possible inconsistents98. If this is so, you say you wonder how time enters into all 
things, spiritual as well as corporeal, while extension enters only into corporeal things. I reply 
that the relations are the same in the one case as in the other, for every change, spiritual as 
                                                          
96 The problem generally arises once we spread the net of mutual determination on the entire 
universe, insisting that for anything to be, it must influence (if indirectly) everything there is, and so a 
universal common ground of all the interactions in the world is needed, which consequently cannot 
be but delimited independently from outside irrespective of particular points of view within the 
world, which makes it merely formal. This is precisely the consequence Leibniz claims to avoid with 
his monadic structure, yet various commentators failed to see this, accusing him of exactly the same 
deficiencies he charges his opponents with: namely, that the structure is merely formal, that there is 
no content to all the mirroring, and so the monads are ultimately indiscernible. We will investigate 
their puzzlement in the next section. 
97 See: L, 531, 583, 604, 656, 666; NE, 229; „time and space (or the order of possible existence) (NE, 
694); 
98 See: L, 531, 583; „order of successive phenomena“ (L, 604); „order of existence which is not 
simultaneous“ (L, 656) 
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well as material, has its own place [sedes], so to speak, in the order of time, as well as its 
own location in the order of coexistents, or in space.” (L, 531)  
 If we take the structural symmetry seriously, monadic states are at least equally 
eligible for introducing self-differentiation as monadic locations. Just as a single monadic 
state  mirrors the entire universe as if extended in space, a single monadic location mirrors 
the entire universe as if extended in time. Both are merely inverse extremes of an ideal 
projection of a continuously spatiotemporal phenomenal world: either the entire world can 
be spread in space while shrinking the dimension of time to an unextended point (a state), 
or it can be spread in time while shrinking the dimension of space to an unextended point (a 
location) – in both projections the world is represented in all its variety, nothing is left out, 
nothing is added. But neither monadic state, nor monadic location can be subject of any real 
determination, which is influence or action, because none of them intrinsically changes or 
diversifies itself – rather by being arbitrarily defined slices within permanent flux of reality, 
they are the very (relative) norms of stability, forming a coordinate system of identification 
of events (spatiotemporal interaction requires homogeneity of certain properties of 
interacting entities, namely extension and duration, and in the absence of other 
discriminating signs, those entities qua spatiotemporally interacting entities are extrinsically 
identified in reference to the identity of a location and intrinsically differentiated in 
reference to the identity of different states).  
 Monads are neither mirrors of the entire space as perceived from one of its points, 
nor mirrors of the entire time as perceived from one of its points – and not even mirrors of 
the entire space-time as perceived from one of its points. They extend to the outer limits of 
space, just as they extend to the outer limits of time, because their identity therein is 
defined by their manifestations, i. e. by the effects of their actions, which correspondingly 
spread to the outer limits of the universe. We need not thoroughly examine a single spatial 
point or a single moment of time in order to delimit the identity of a monad within 
permanent flux of reality, rather we need to track a continuous series of action exhibiting a 
single pattern – or a law99. A monad is recognised in a body currently in charge of executing 
                                                          
99 “The succeeding substance will be considered the same as the preceding as long as the same law of 
the series or of simple continuous transition persists, which makes us believe in the same subject of 
change, or the monad. The fact that a certain law persists which involves all of the future states of 
that which we conceive to be the same — this is the very fact, I say, which constitutes the enduring 
substance.” (L, 535) 
“But that which persists, insofar as it involves all cases, contains primitive force, so that primitive 
force is the law of the series, as it were, while derivative force is the determinate value which 
distinguishes some term in the series.” (L, 533) 
See also: L, 360,  
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its actions: all of the extended parts of the body are in permanent flux100 and the sole 
principle of its identity is found in the correspondent law of a series of actions. The body 
assigned to the monad has blurred outlines101: its limits are not limits of the monad – rather, 
the monad itself is a limit of the identity of the body: it carves out a region within the whole 
of all the happenings – or manifestations – which mirrors according to unique law of 
morphism prescribed by the monad the rest of what there is. Imagined thus, the world 
consist of an infinity of intersecting closed boundaries102, each of which encircles parts of the 
other boundaries and defines therewith a morphism holding between the parts of all the 
boundaries situated on one side of the boundary in question and those situated on the other 
side. In this sense, a monad is a measure of correlation between the internal and the 
external within a plenum of happenings: which entails, for example, that this event, which is 
a concussion, mirrors that event, which is a fall of a bough – and by defining specific 
correlations between all the events, it defines a particular point of view among them, which 
amounts to defining an individuum – a spontaneously acting being. There is no continuous 
                                                          
100 “It is true, of course, that a soul cannot pass over from one organic body into another but remains 
always in the same organic body, not even death violating this law. But it must be remembered that 
even this organic body remains the same in the way in which the ship of Theseus or a river does; that 
is, it is in perpetual flux. And perhaps no portion of matter can be designated which always remains 
the property of the same animal or soul.” (L, 597) 
101 “There is no actual determinate figure in things, for none can satisfy the infinity of impressions.” 
(L, 270) 
102 Leibniz accomplishes his revision of the concept of substance under the heading of restitution of 
Aristotelian substantial forms: and a form can be seen as a definite shape or figure (a “closed 
boundary”) encircling certain region of in itself undifferentiated subsistent content – i. e. matter. 
Though it is arguable to what extent did his commitments from the middle period survived till up to 
the later years, and for example the five-tier hylomorphic ontology (“(1) the primitive entelechy or 
soul; (2) primary matter or primitive passive power; (3) the complete monad formed by these two; 
(4) mass or secondary matter, or the organic machine in which innumerable subordinate monads 
concur; and (5) the animal or corporeal substance which the dominating monad makes into one 
machine” (L, 530)) which Leibniz develops in his correspondence with De Volder looks a bit too 
bloated to be considered a standard view, it is safe to say that something remains retained from the 
idea of a form even till Monadology and beyond. I am inclined to think that while he gradually 
deprived of independent reality all of that which formerly constituted the material – or passive, 
undifferentiated, homogeneous, indifferent – parts of the scheme (i. e. primary and secondary 
matter), he nevertheless retained the defining principles of the formal – or active, self-
differentiating, heterogeneous, teleological (entelechy): “Forms are for me nothing but activities or 
entelechies, and substantial forms are the primary entelechies.” (L, 511) and “… all the bodies in the 
world arise from an interaction of internal forces, and I have no doubt that these forces are coeval 
with matter itself, for I believe that matter cannot subsist in itself without forces.” (L, 511.) 
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manifold of events needed to be posited beforehand, because events are nothing but 
intersections of boundaries, or their mirror images. Thus, a monad defines relations of 
mirroring (mutual determination) among events (phenomena), while being a mirror image of 
all the other monads.  
 3.1.3 Meanings of the mirroring relation. Therefore, there seems to be two meanings 
to the mirroring: mirroring among spatiotemporally interacting phenomena, i. e. causally 
related events, which are points of intersection of various identity criteria for living bodies 
provided by monads, and mirroring among the monads themselves103. In both cases the 
mirroring takes place between extrinsic determinations and intrinsic determinations: either 
between phenomena occurring outside of a living body and those occurring inside it, or 
between multiple beings and their representations within a single one. The latter is 
therefore the very principle of diversity, or variety, within the world on the most 
fundamental level, just as it is the principle of identity among bodies. Passages like the 
following one clearly show that Leibniz did not consider the two meanings of the mirroring 
to be essentially divergent, forming two distinct levels of ontology104, rather, he meant the 
                                                          
103 Thus, a monad as a principle of self-differentiation is a continuous function, a law of the series, 
whose values are individual events – which are the discriminating signs introduced in 1.1 construed 
as real determinants. This is what Leibniz had in mind in Monadology: “But besides the principle of 
change there must be some distinguishing detail in that which changes, which constitutes the 
specific nature and the variety, so to speak, of simple substances.” (L, 645) 
However, in his correspondence with De Volder and Des Bosses, Leibniz regularly uses other terms 
for the delimited dichotomy: primary and secondary force. Whereas primary force is the self-
differentiating principle of a monad, which produces all the variety from itself and for itself, 
secondary force is that in virtue of which a being manifest itself, exercising its causal influence 
everything there is. Their relation is again that of a function and its value: “But that which persists, 
insofar as it involves all cases, contains primitive force, so that primitive force is the law of the series, 
as it were, while derivative force is the determinate value which distinguishes some term in the 
series.” (L, 533) 
104 Certain commentators hold that Leibniz’s ontology can be divided into two levels (Mates, 1986), 
while others maintain that it be divided into three levels (Anapolitanos, 1999); yet others stress 
smooth transitions between the levels: Adams (1994) wants mere ideal things to be seen in line with 
real phenomena “as an infinite gradation of approximations to reality“ (Adams, 1994, p. 254) to 
revoke the „metaphysical apartheid“ introduced by Harzt and Cover. As for my part, I do not see a 
need, nor a sense in stratifying Leibniz’s ontology: what we mean by real being, or simply being, is 
always the same, but once we try to pin it down to a fully determined position in an independent 
extrinsic structure of representations (be it formalized extension of a natural language, formal 
ontology, or abstracted realm of sense perceptions), we inevitably already miss what was for it to be 
real (see my treatment of subjects of PII in 2.4). This does not preclude various degrees of perfection 
to be construed as “quantity of positive reality” (L, 647) and utilized in explication of monadic 
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mirroring to be in a way univocal (hence the “univocity of being” promoted in the footnote 
104):  
 “In natural perception and feeling it suffices that what is divisible and material and is 
found dispersed among several beings should be expressed or represented in a single 
indivisible being or in a substance which is endowed with a true unity. […] Now this 
expression takes place everywhere, because every substance sympathizes with all the others 
and receives a proportional change corresponding to the slightest change which occurs in 
the whole world, although this change will be more or less noticeable as other bodies or 
their actions have more or less relationship with ours.” (L, 339) 
 Yet, alongside with the aforementioned mirroring of causes in their joint effect and 
the mirroring of beings in their joint representation, Leibniz regularly gives examples of 
mirroring of a spatially larger organism into smaller ones, construed as its organs105. This 
should be understood along the lines of the proposed univocity of mirroring.  
 A misunderstanding might be lurking unseen at this point: namely, (i) that the regions 
demarcated within a plenum of happenings strictly correlate with spatial regions occupied 
by extended objects, or even worse, (ii) that spatial parts strictly correlate with parts of 
identity criteria. Neither of the aforementioned holds, of course, as expounded earlier: ad (i) 
complete spreading of phenomena in a spatial dimension is an ideal projection which 
effectively relaxes their interconnectedness and rules out any possibility of mirroring among 
them construed as a real mutual determination, ad (ii) spatial parts are in permanent flux, 
whereas identity criteria transcend the flux. The arguments connected with (i) elaborated 
earlier in the text facilitate to think of a continuous transition between causes and effects (as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
domination – as Look (2002) did. What is ultimately real are only monads, taken in general, of course 
– but they are not real as generalities: rather, this or that monad is ultimately real – this dog is 
ultimately real (not as a general term „a dog“, supplemented, maybe, with additional qualifications 
like „at this moment standing one meter before me“, but as an individual, truly singular monad, 
whose full conceptual determination would require infinite analysis – and whose identity, therefore, 
remains forever inscrutable for a finite mind). 
105 Consider the “cheese with worms” analogy (L, 521; NE, 722), or “pond full of fish” analogy in 
Theodicy (Th, 59) and vividly depicted in Monadology (66.-70.) (L, 650) as well; however closest to 
complete self-similarity among physical phenomena are his portrayals of organisms as machines 
consisting of yet another machines etc. ad infinitum: “For since the mechanisms of nature are 
mechanisms down to their smallest parts, they are indestructible, since smaller machines are 
enfolded in greater machines into infinity.” (L, 589)  
“A natural machine remains a machine even in its smallest parts, and what is more, it always remains 
the same machine that it has been, being merely transformed through the different foldings which it 
undergoes, and being now extended, now compressed and, as it were, concentrated, when it is 
thought to have perished.” (L, 456)  
Further references can be found in: L, 499, 529, 637, 649 (Monadology, 64.). 
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events) and organisms (as living bodies106) among all phenomena. Consider a passage from a 
letter to Jacob Thomasius:  
 “I observe in advance that numerically the same change may be the generation of 
one being and the alteration of another; for example, since we know that putrefaction 
consists in little worms invisible to the naked eye, any putrid infection is an alteration of 
man, a generation of the worm.” (L, 96) 
 If we bear in mind that “in a strict metaphysical sense” the worm “cannot  
begin except by creation or end except by annihilation” (L, 643) and that this everlasting 
worm is not to be equated with a sum of its spatial parts, which are in permanent flux, but 
rather with the course of its operations, there is nothing controversial in concluding that the 
illness of a man, which is an event in the course of human life, be equated with a worm, 
which is a living body.  
 Only if the notion of mirroring is univocal in this sense, it can effectively facilitate the 
conjunction demanded by PII, as envisioned in 2.5 – because the conjunction in question is 
not merely a conjunction of the intrinsic and the extrinsic, of the ever self-differentiating 
heterogeneous multiplicity of a monad taken in itself and the self-identical homogenous 
plurality of monads taken in their relations as the world, but a conjunction of the real, the 
efficient, and its representation as well.  
 
 3.2 Proposed models of the mirroring. In the last few pages of the thesis I want to 
draw the attention of the reader to some models of the mirroring structure given in 
secondary literature in order to shed light on certain perplexing aspects of the system. It 
follows from what has already been said that those approaches are inevitably doomed to 
failure right from the beginning, because the monadic structure cannot be delimited 
independently of its specific content, but even in their failure, something substantial about 
the nature of the problems they try to address is revealed.  
 Commentators generally struggled with two interrelated peculiarities of the monadic 
system: (i) just as there is no structure independent of its content in the monadic system, 
there is no content independent of the structure either – there is no independently 
determinable ultimate content of all the mirroring; (ii) the structure is self-similar, but there 
is no independently determinable pattern, which would be repeated in different scales on 
various levels of the fractal structure – as the pattern is dependent on a point of view of a 
                                                          
106 It is woth stressing that only living bodies are real – only they maintain their unity by themselves 
in their continuous action in the course of the entire world history – and their identity, therefore, 
cannot be delimited in recourse to extension only; whereas dead bodies are merely unities by 
aggregation – and their identity is therefore genuine subject of extrinsic determination in an 
independent structure, such as that of spatial extension.  
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particular monad – and so the riddle of finding a ground level in a self-similar structure is 
rather void. We will address these perplexities respectively. 
 3.2.1 The first riddle: What is ultimately expressed in all those expressions? Mates 
(1986) gives a nice overview of concerns raised by various authors regarding the issue107; 
Lotze’s doubts are somehow symptomatic:  
“… Therefore, what each monad can reflect is only the way in which it itself is reflected in 
others and these are reflected in one another; there would be no independent state of 
affairs or content in the universe to serve as grist for this process of reflection.” (Lotze 
(1868), 13-14, quoted from Mates (1986, 79)) 
What Lotze searches for is analogous to Aristotelian ὑποκειμένον – which served Aristotle 
on the one hand as a logical subject108, on the other hand as a subject of a real change109 
among beings: in Aristotle’s words “something must be underlying” (Aristotle (1984), 
Physics, 191a31) – except that we need something underlying all those reflections, not 
changes110. Worth noting are Lotze’s specifications “independent state of affairs”, as 
contrasted with only relative state of affairs (or organization), and “content”, as contrasted 
with empty form (or abstract structure). The first points in the direction of an agelong 
philosophers’ endeavour to disclose things as they are “in themselves” (per se – though 
there is some curious shift of meaning between in itself and for itself alluding to subjectivity 
or self-reflection famously utilized by Hegel) – and not merely in relation to others (per alia) 
– with the “in itself” alluding to independence, or even separation. The second one further 
qualifies a role of a subject (ὑποκειμένον): every form, every relational structure 
presupposes something to be structured that way – and this can hardly be a structure itself, 
else we fall into an infinite regress: we need some “content” to the form. What is not a 
structure, what is opposed to every structure is ultimately simple.  
 But all of this seems to be exactly what is searched for in the notion of substance – or 
at least what Leibniz himself must have been searching in that notion. How does it come 
                                                          
107 He mentions Lotze, Windelband, Heimsoeth, Joseph and Russel. It is somehow curious that the 
more contemporary authors do not seem to be bothered by those difficulties, even though solutions 
offered in later literature, including Mates (1986), are far from satisfactory, as will be shown in the 
subsequent. 
108 See: Aristotle (1984), Categories, 2 (1a20) 
109 See: Aristotle (1984), Physics, I, 8 (191a31) 
110 In Leibniz’s system all the real mutual determination of the ultimate beings boils down to 
universally unqualified mutual representation, because other modes of interaction can be conceived 
of as qualified representations relative to some independent external point of view, which is 
excluded as a mere abstraction, since all and only metaphysical points of view are the ultimate 
beings themselves. See: 3.1.2. 
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that Leibniz’s account manifestly betrays precisely those criteria which it supposedly sprang 
from?  
 Mates understands the difficulty as a logical paradox and offers “a numerical model 
of the possible worlds”111. He proceeds in two steps: first he comes up with a formalisation 
which assigns a real number greater than 1 to every single state within a continuous series of 
monadic states of every one of the infinitude of monads in every one of the infinitude of 
possible worlds112; and then he associates a set of simple properties or their negations to 
each of those numbers by associating every position of a nonterminating binary expansion of 
its reciprocal one member of a denumerable set of the simple properties and deciding if the 
monadic state has the property or not, based on whether 1 or 0 occupies the associated 
position. Correspondingly, every complete individual concept consists of a continuous series 
of ordered sets of simple properties – each of those sets standing for one monadic state. 
Moreover, with the complete knowledge of one single monadic state of an arbitrary monad 
in an arbitrary world (i. e. with the knowledge which one of the infinite set of simple 
properties is to be ascribed and which one denied to the state, with the knowledge of the 
order of those properties and with the knowledge of all the relevant formulas) one is 
capable of computing a real number assigned to this particular state and therewith real 
numbers assigned to all the other monadic states of all the monads in all the worlds and 
determining their sets of properties – in this sense every monadic state mirrors not only all 
the past and future states of a particular monad, but past and future states of all the monads 
in this world as well as in all the other possible worlds113.   
 The outcome of his effort should be the proof “that there is no inconsistency in the 
mirroring aspect of Leibniz’s monadology”. This addresses only a fraction of the problem. 
Although it is true that some commentators worried about a circularity of Leibniz’s 
description indicating that, since all the monads do is expressing one another’s expressing 
one another, alongside with an ultimate content of those expressions the real difference 
between them is missing as well, the issue is not purely logical. Mates shows that a model 
can be found for the description – proving therewith its consistency. Insofar as the model is 
a mere mathematical structure it is purely formal and lacks any content by definition. If he 
                                                          
111 See: Mates (1986, pp. 80-83) 
112 The corresponding formula for an ascending series of real numbers r representing successive 
monadic states of the pth monad in the nth world is: p + (1 – 1/2n-1) ≤ r < p + (1 – 1/2n). 
113 If this is considered too much, the remedy will be no big deal: it suffices, for example, to come up 
with a unique formula ascribing real line positions to monads for every possible world, so that you 
can deduce monadic states in other worlds from a single state in this one only at the proviso of 
knowing the particular “laws” governing that world. Mates mentions other features of monadology 
not represented in his model, such as the directedness of time and clarity of perceptions, but this 
deficiency is not essential at this point. 
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had confined his enterprise to the first step solely, all of it would be isomorphic: possible 
worlds, monads and their states, all of this would be differentiated only by their arbitrarily 
chosen position on the presupposed real line structure – there would be structural 
difference between monadic states, which are points, and monads or possible worlds, which 
are line segments, but there would be nothing “in the states themselves” to differentiate 
them from one another (else we reify the real line itself and make it into the ultimate 
substance, half actual, half potential, of all worlds – a rather peculiar idea), since the 
assignment of a monadic state to a real number is arbitrary and could have been constructed 
equally well otherwise.  
 Leibniz had, of course, no idea of the arithmetization of the continuum pioneered by 
Dedekind and Cantor and so he could not have come up with a model like this, nevertheless 
he actually considered the case of differentiating line segments by their respective positions 
on a geometrical line and his remarks are quite illuminating: “Such concepts men can easily 
imagine to be diverse without diversity – for example, two equal parts of a straight line, 
since the straight line is something incomplete and abstract, which needs to be considered 
only in theory. But in nature every straight line is distinguishable by its contents from every 
other.” (L, 529) The sole abstract structure, the form of geometrical line, does not grant 
individuality to the segments into which it can be cut, it is only in virtue of its varying 
content, once it is reified (realized, materialized), that those segments differ and do not 
conflate into one another. 
 However, Mates does not stop here and proceeds further to let the positions on the 
real line uniquely refer to infinite sets of properties. The real line does not have to be reified 
in order to render the monadic states different, because those are differentiated in virtue of 
having variant properties. The identity of monadic states is constituted in singular reference 
to sets of simple properties; by contrast, the simple properties are genuinely differentiated 
in themselves, thanks to their identity being qualitative. But this is not the end of the story, 
because the ascription of consecutive positions of the binary expansions of reciprocals of 
reals greater than 1 to simple properties cannot be unequivocally defined without those 
properties being already not only gathered in a set, but ordered as well – otherwise, there 
would be no chance to determine which property is to be associated with which position on 
a string of zeros and ones. The ultimate content of all the mirroring, the final non-relational 
differentiating signs genuinely distinct in themselves, the fundamental ontological level 
consist of qualitatively differentiated properties and an independent ω-sequence structure, 
granting them not the identity, which they already have in virtue of their qualitative 
difference, but the total order. It is no wonder that with those resources the arithmetized 
continuum may be reconstructed – and therewith the mirroring structure sketched above – 
but without the ordering, it would hardly be conceivable.  
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 3.2.2 The fundamental level. It may be doubted that this must necessarily be the 
fundamental ontological level, despite being the ultimate content of mirroring and despite 
being the ground level of non-relational differentiating signs – after all being a differentiating 
sign as well as being content pertain to the realm of representation, which may be 
understood as merely conceptual, whereas the ontology may be understood as 
transcendent. Such a scheme would render only the determination of a monad being 
derived from its properties but not its being. This sounds utterly non-leibnizian, but even 
granted this, it would hardly offer any ground for localizing the ultimate source of reality 
within the system in monads: there are properties, their order, monadic states, monads, 
possible worlds, the structure of the entire continuum, on which everything is modelled – 
why would the reality enter into the scheme exactly at the level of monads?  
 If we exclude the realm of ordered simple properties, there still remain monadic 
states as the most plausible candidates for fundamental elements of reality114; or we can 
conclude that, since the fundamental elements are to be inherently structured in either 
case, there is no reason to presuppose as ultimately real a plurality (being an independent 
structure external to the in themselves individuated elements) of individual monads, rather 
than a single universe responsible for the reality of the monads gathered in it, yet 
structurally isomorphic to them – this being the most parsimonious ontology, jettisoning the 
superfluous structure of the plurality interrelating individual monads. The exclusion of 
monadic states might very well be justified on grounds that there is a structural difference 
between the way in which monadic states compose a monad and between the way in which 
individual monads compose the universe: because monadic states form a continuous series, 
the monad cannot be actually divided into them, in Leibniz’s conception of continuity, and  
does not “result” from them, but rather the other way round – those states being merely 
potential results of a division which is conceived of as ideal, carried out merely in thought; 
whereas the universe, on the contrary, consist of a discrete manifold of monads and is 
therefore actually divided into them. However, it should be noted that (i) Mates’ model does 
not explicitly favour this option, since the monadic composition of each possible world – as 
well as all of them taken together – is no less continuous than the composition of an 
individual monad, and (ii) the very continuity of monadic states is itself a controversial 
interpretive issue115. Furthermore, this does not yet give the plurality of monads any priority 
over the universe as a whole. Since every monad mirrors the entire universe, it retains in 
itself the structure of composition of all the monads (i. e. is isomorphic to the world) and if 
                                                          
114 Which is the answer Mates in the end, contrary to Leibniz’s explicit remarks, apparently opts for. 
However, we rejected any asymmetry between monadic states and monadic locations in 3.1.2. and 
Mates (1986) preoccupation with monadic states seems to us simply flawed. For a discussion see 
Whipple (2010). 
115 See: Whipple (2010). 
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the discreteness of the manifoldness of monads suffice for the universe to be actually 
divided into them, why would it be insufficient to render the monad’s representation of the 
universe to be actually divided into representations of the individual monads (and those 
again into their representations of the individual monads etc. ad infinitum)? This undermines 
not only the thesis of simplicity of the monad, but the thesis of plurality of substances as 
well: if structural reasons led to the exclusion of a monadic state from the list of possible 
candidates for substance, they cannot settle a tie between the monad and the world – or 
rather, they decide it in favour of the world for the sake of ontological parsimony.  
 Other models have been devised, which treat monadic states on par with monadic 
locations, adding even more candidates to the list of equivalently eligible fundamental 
elements of the ontology. While Anapolitanos (1999) in his book-length effort develops only 
a topological description of four-dimensional manifold of space-time, Grene and Ravetz 
(1962), 37 years earlier, in their succinct article putted down a model of Leibnizian universe 
as a set of differential equations. Their approach is both challenging and yet pretty 
concordant with Leibniz’s original intentions116. Nevertheless, they stick with a sole formal 
structure and consequently they cannot really address the issue of why should the reality 
enter into it exactly at the level of monads, if any set of values, which makes up a monad, 
can be computed given only one value of whichever equation you choose and the 
correspondent equations.  
 3.2.3 The second riddle: What could be a ground level in a self-similar structure? Self-
similarity is a feature of a structure alone and ordinarily entails replication of the same 
pattern at different scales. But Leibnizian universe is not to be a pure structure: there is to 
be some content – delivering non-relational inherent diversity – if it was not for this content, 
monads would be only numerically distinct and the structure of the universe would be not 
only perfectly self-similar across the various levels of representation117, but on the same 
level as well (and thus, monads would be indiscernible from one another). Where by levels 
of representation I mean this: an individual monad represents the entire universe as a 
multiplicity of a specific structure (relative to its particular point of view) – this is the first 
                                                          
116 We have seen in 3.1.3. that Leibniz himself sometimes treated monad as a function with its 
individual discriminating signs as its values. But we have already seen as well, that those 
discriminating signs cannot be positions in a universally applicable coordinate system – as Grene and 
Ravetz (1962) would have it.  
117 It should be noted that Leibniz himself often in his multiple illustrations or examples of the 
mirroring structure cashes out those levels of self-similarity in terms of spatial scaling – as pointed 
out in 3.1.4. (e. g. “a machine inside a machine”). But this is misleading, since at least temporal 
dimension is needed as well – and even this would not suffice. All such illustrative scenarios are 
nothing but incomplete idealisations. For a detailed discussion see the entire section 3.1. 
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level of representation (a representation of “plurality in the simple”118); but the multiplicity 
in question is a multiplicity of monads, which are representations of the universe from their 
respective perspectives, i. e. multiplicities of specific structures relative to their particular 
points of view – this is the second level of representation (a representation of 
representations of “plurality in the simple”); and so on ad infinitum. In the case of self-
similarity on a single level, a monad would represent multiplicity of multiplicities identical to 
it, while in the case of self-similarity across the levels, a monad would represent multiplicity 
of multiplicities distinct from it and distinct from one another, yet each of them consisting of 
all but one of the multiplicities represented by the original monad. All the monads are 
represented again and again on various levels, whereas their multiplicity gets multiplied on 
every next level once more. The structure of their multiplicity alternates, individuating the 
monads on different levels in manifold ways, but if the same monad was identified on a 
different level, it would exhibit the same intrinsic structure – hence self-similarity across the 
levels of representation. (However, needless to say, such identification would require infinite 
analysis and thus is not feasible for a finite mind.) 
 Though there is an infinite regress of determination inherent to the structure, the 
supposition of an intrinsically diversified content can be made to the effect of saving distinct 
monads from conflating into a single one. This has already been testified by our investigation 
of Mates’ model. Moreover, Mates used the real line as a convenient tool to prove 
consistency of Leibniz’s mirroring structure, without putting much emphasis on the peculiar 
coincidence that Leibniz himself considered his theory of monad as a way out of the 
labyrinth of the continuum119; now, we can clearly see why could he be actually more 
successful in this enterprise than usually admitted, foreshadowing the arithmetization of the 
continuum, which was to come nearly two centuries later: it suffices to posit countably many 
monads for their representations to boast a structure of an uncountable complexity – since 
on the ω-level of representation a representation of a single monad comprises mℵ0 elements, 
where m indicates the number of monads (Leibniz seems to demand infinitely many of 
them, but generally any countable number m≥2 suffices: 2ℵ0 = ℵ1). Furthermore, it is clear 
that we reach the cardinality of the continuum only at the farthest level of representation (i. 
e. phenomena – which are by definition representations of something ultimately real), 
whereas on the level of ontology, there are only countably many substances.   
 It is hard to evaluate the outcome from Leibniz’s perspective, since Leibniz would 
most probably oppose the arithmetization of the continuum, and since he did not recognize 
the dichotomy of the countable and the uncountable, utilizing only the one between the 
                                                          
118 L, 662. 
119 See: L, 343, 604. 
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finite and the infinite. However consider the case he made for denying reality to infinite 
number. 
 3.2.4 Actual infinity. Various commentators felt puzzled by Leibniz endorsing actual 
infinity of monads, while denying infinite number, or an infinite whole. It is not the case that 
Leibniz would consider all infinities to be merely potential (merely potential infinity is a false 
infinity: at every single step being only finite – if augmented with a prospect of further 
extension), rather he considers the infinity of monads to be complete and fully realized120. 
Any number whatsoever is an abstraction, nothing real, only an incomplete notion, which by 
the very fact of its incompleteness can be fully determined in language, or generally: have a 
fully determinate representation – if this is always merely relative, depending on a particular 
conceptual scheme and cannot account for all the difference relations to everything there is. 
But this is not be the case with the infinity, that is by definition non-terminating, 
encompassing either everything there is, or everything within a particular selection, which 
cannot be specified from within – by way of determining its individual constituents, which no 
finite mind can accomplish – but rather only from outside – by way of carving it out of its 
exterior: which is in turn once again non-terminating and cannot be gathered by a finite 
mind. Infinity lacks the “incompleteness” of abstract notions, which would enable it to be 
represented in full: it always requires a grasp of a certain realm in its entirety. Whereas a 
finite whole is merely a unity by aggregation, i. e. its unity is determined by extrinsic 
aggregation of intrinsic unities, an infinite whole is only a fictional whole, as Harmer (2014) 
put it, whose unity is determined neither in itself, nor by extrinsic aggregation of intrinsic 
unities. If the infinity lacks determinate unity, its constituents lack determinate numerical 
identity, and their plurality cannot be countable. There are, of course, countable infinities – 
such as the infinity of natural numbers – however, those are not actual infinities – as is the 
infinity of monads – but rather merely potential infinities: the infinity of natural numbers is 
indeed countable, composed by aggregation of determinate unities, yet a natural number is 
merely finite at every single step of the aggregating process, which only potentially 
                                                          
120 This is how both Russell (1900) and Harmer (2014) understood Leibniz’s position finding it 
consequent and justified, though Russell reportedly (Lison, 2006) denounced Leibniz’s critique of 
infinite number later on, as did other commentators (see: Lison, 2006), based on his conflating two 
methods of measuring magnitudes later elaborated by Cantor (i. e. comparing distances between 
extreme members, or establishing one-to-one correspondence between all intermediary members). 
Lison (2006) does not address the issue of compatibility of Leibniz’s rejection of infinite number and 
actual infinity of monads, but shows that his arguments against the infinite  overlap with his 
arguments against the continuous (the diagonal paradox) and crucially depend on Euclidean part-
whole axiom, which can be either accepted, or rejected, – and Leibniz actually considered the 
distinction sketched above, disposing with the axiom and foreshadowing Cantor‘s position, only to 
dismiss it few years later – and so  his position is at least logically equivalent to Cantors. 
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approaches the infinity as its vanishing point. And so if the infinity is to be actual, it must be 
indeterminate in the aforementioned sense.  
 The claim that there is actual infinity of monads, thus, virtually amounts to the claim 
that their number is indeterminate121, that there is no determinate number of them on the 
most fundamental (i. e. immediate) ontological level. Remember that we have stated in 2.5 
that there is no independently determinable plurality of monads, there is no immediate, or 
objective, number of them: the structure of their multiplicity is always merely subjective, 
mediated by reflection into a particular monad. What is peculiar to the model sketched 
above is the fact that strictly speaking we do not need infinity of monads in order for them 
to yield a plurality of the cardinality of continuum: any countable number (m≥2) suffices. 
Regardless of the precise number of monads the cardinality of the multiplicity of their 
representations equals ℵ1.  
 3.2.4 The model. This is the best we can do to make the monadic structure explicit. 
The immediate structure122 of monads is completely indeterminate; however, the structure 
of monads as mediated by its reflection123 into a particular monad finds its determination as 
intrinsic self-differentiation of this particular monad. Therefore, there is a multiplicity of 
relative structuring of the multiplicity of monads – which is this multiplicity itself. We have 
seen in 1.3 that there is not a single prominent structure (as for example that of natural 
numbers) and so the question of the particular structure of the multiplicity of monads does 
not boil down to the question of whether there are three or five monads (e. g. that from the 
point of view of a monad A there are three of them and from the point of view of a monad B 
there are five of them), rather a particular type of a structure carries with itself particular 
principles of identification and differentiation of its elements (i. e. the principles of how are 
the elements of the structure to be gathered together or how are they to be individuated 
within the structure – as discussed in 1.2) and so there is no external independent measure 
by which we could compare the particular representations of the multiplicity among 
themselves and tell: this one is bigger than this one, this one includes this one as its part, or 
this one is isomorphic to that one. The representations of the multiplicity are heterogeneous 
to one another, because every monad is completely singular, unique, establishing its own 
identity by itself – and yet, as “representations of multiplicity in the simple”, they are the 
                                                          
121 Bassler (1998) explores Leibniz‘s notion of syncategoremaic infinite as indefinite. Both Harmer 
(2014) and Bassler (1998) agree that Leibniz rejects the infinite in categorematic sense, while 
endorsing the infinite in syncategorematic sense (i. e. in a negative sense – in-finite: there is always a 
next one), and while limiting the infinite in „hypercategorematic“ sense to God alone. Leibniz 
exposes his mature view at length in: NE, 161-164. 
122 The term immediate structure has been introduced in 1.2.  




very principles of homogeneity, they are the only determinate structures there are in the 
world. The very same monads could in principle be identified in all the monadic 
representations, but none of the monadic representations considered in itself can account 
for such identification, since the discerning capacities of monads are merely finite – only God 
could do this: as if to count the uncountable. From whichever point of view (point of view of 
a particular monad) you look at the multiplicity of monads, it suffices for their structure to 
be determinate and somehow at least dual (m≥2) – which should be construed as having at 
least some principle of diversification, or variety, within itself, aside from the intrinsic 
principle of unity – for its representation to boast the cardinality of continuum on the ω-th 
level. However, the assumption of well-ordered levels of representation should itself be 
viewed as problematic – after all taking it immediately for granted would commit us to 
acknowledging an extrinsically determinable ω-structure posited independently and prior to 
the monadic structure. Two concerns hinder the immediate commitment: (i) as shown in 1.3, 
the transition from “the former and the latter” to “the first and the second” is not at all 
straightforward, (ii) since there is no universal means of identification of monads across the 
levels, there is no universal mean of individuating the levels of representation either. On the 
other hand, if we reject the assumption of well-orderedness, could we still fancy the idea of 
approaching the cardinality of continuum in the analysis of the representation? Definitely 
not; Leibniz himself did not arithmetized the continuum – and the question lets itself be 
posed the other way round as well: if we could take for granted the assumption of well-
orderedness of the analysis, we could in principle arithmetize the continuum, but since the 
identification of the levels of representation requires identification of its elements across the 
levels, which could not be established before the end of the infinite analysis, which is 
beyond our reach, the assumption will always remain unjustified for a finite mind – and 


















 So far we have explored all the essential features of the monadic structure as 
pertaining to semantics and ontology. I hope that I have satisfactorily shown that this is 
indeed the simplest conceivable structure; and, as I believe, every post-leibnizian attempt at 
fundamental ontology, as well as generally every philosophical enterprise concerned with 
delimiting some ultimate foundations (be they of mathematics, logic, semantic of natural 
languages or whatever) should face the challenge posed by the expounded deliberations 
outright.  
 I will not venture into any historical speculation, but one can at least vividly imagine 
that it was precisely Leibniz’s lifetime struggle for devising something like “universal 
characteristic”, which eventually led him to those very limits of conceivability, as embodied 
in the concept of monad, before which he stood astonished and stupefied, reluctant to fully 
acknowledge that his lifetime dream may well get completely shattered by the encounter. A 
different thesis with a vastly different approach to the issue would be needed in order to 
explore a source and nature of those limits of thinking: what does it mean that I share them 
with somebody who died more than 300 years ago, does it have something to do with the 
fact that my philosophical education consist of reading texts such as his and the like? I do 
not feel hard-pressed to address such perplexities in this paper, as I will content myself with 
the ascertainment that for one reason or another, after all, we indeed experience those 
limits: we encountered them in the course of the reasoning just undertaken – as various 
commentators of Leibniz’s texts have encountered them already before.  
 In acknowledging this we do not need to make any far reaching commitments: all we 
need is to believe that philosophical interpretation is possible – that it is possible to “follow 
someone’s thinking”. I do not know if we share the same logical principles, the same 
inferential rules, I do not know if we share the same syntax, or the same meanings – and I 
am generally more or less sceptical about all of this – but if anything philosophers have ever 
done has to have any meaning at all, it must be possible to “follow” the ideas of others, 
there must be some principle of limitation to the freewheeling machine of thinking which 
guides its course from within so that we may eventually say: I know where is it going – and it 
must be so, I cannot think of it otherwise.  
 Regarding the issues of variety or plurality in a system, determinate difference and 
identity, multiplicities of all kind, the simplest conceivable structure is one such limit, or 
guideline of thinking. I do not think it must necessarily be some transcendental condition in a 
Kantian sense – rather, it is something hopefully each of us has in his peculiar way 
experienced in the course of the present reasoning, something which Leibniz’s texts helped 
us disclose in our own thinking – and something which reflexively shed new light on Leibniz’s 
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